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The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional
Judgment and Organizational Representation
ROBERT ELI ROSEN*
I. WHAT Is AN ENLIGHTENMENT?
Inside counsel-lawyers who are employees of private business corpora-
tions-now are being called "corporate counsel." Once they were "house
counsel," "tame" and "kept" lawyers.1 In forsaking organizational inde-
pendence-the mantle of the free professional2-they once subjected them-
selves to the accusation of having sold their professional souls, if not their
human ones, for a mess of pottage.' Once castigated, inside counsel re-
portedly now are accorded not only "admiration and respect" by their
corporate employers4 but also "growing prestige" within the bar. 5
* Associate Professor, University of Miami Law School. This paper was drafted while
Professor Rosen was a Fellow in the Program in Ethics and the Professions at Harvard
University. It has benefited from the comments of Arthur Applbaum, Mary Coombs and
Elizabeth Leiman.
Unidentified quotations from lawyers reported in this essay derive from a study of the
provision of legal services to six major manufacturing companies reported in R. Rosen,
Lawyers in Corporate Decision-Making (1984) (unpublished dissertation available in the Uni-
versity of California-Berkeley library). That research was made possible by the support of the
American Bar Foundation and the Thomasin and Abigail Bellah Foundation.
1. In the 1920's, inside counsel were known as "kept" counsel. Hickman, Corporate
Legal Departments and Retained Counsel, in FuNCTIONS OF CORPORATE LEGAL DEPARTMENTs
1, 2 (1961). In the 1930's, they were known as "house" counsel. Id. "[A] generation or more
ago ... he was a 'tame lawyer,"' Berle noted in 1955. Berle, The Changing Role of the
Corporation and its Counsel, 10 REc. AM. B. Crry N.Y. 266, 267 (1955). Since 1945, inside
counsel have been claiming that they should be called "corporate counsel." Hickman, supra,
at 2; see also Chayes & Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 Sr. L.
REv. 277, 277 (1985) (arguing the enhanced conception of "corporate counsel" is warranted).
2. A "free profession" is a profession "conceived as an esoteric art practiced by a closed
group of people, each having relations to a number of separate clients, and each collecting
his own fees." Hughes, Education for a Profemion, in SEVEN QUSTIONS ABotrr THE PROFESSION
OF LmasnIAsHrP 39 (1962), quoted in E. SMIGEL, TnE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFEsSIoNAL
ORGmqIZAmTON MAN? 293 (1969).
3. See, e.g., R. NELSON, PARTNERS WrrH POWER: SociAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE LARGE
LAW FRm 56 (1988) (outside counsel's attitudes); Davis, Reflections of a Kept Lawyer, 53
A.B.A. J. 349 (1967) (inside counsel's perception).
4. McClements, What a CEO Expects from Corporate Counsel, 4 ACCA DocKET 20, 20
(1986); see also infra note 6.
5. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 277 n.1 (without supplying data); see also C.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs 736 (1986); Maher, Corporate Counsel Come in From the
Cold, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1984, at 42, 43 (based on informal survey). These discussions emphasize
that inside counsel's increased status is of recent vintage. See, e.g., C. WoisRss , supra at 736
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The first subject of this paper is the popular and scholarly reports that
explain and justify inside counsel's new-found success. What is the rela-
tionship between inside counsel's new role within business and their increased
standing within the legal profession? Inside counsel's answer to this question
is that in the modern corporate legal department they are exercising high-
quality professional judgment. Inside counsel qualify the response that their
professional gains derive from their having gained corporate power. They
emphasize that their exercises of corporate power are guided and constrained
by their professional judgment. This response forces us to consider the
relation between professional judgment and corporate goals: In what ways
can a legal practice that is conjoined with corporate power merit professional
respect?
Supposedly, corporations value and empower inside counsel because of
their professional judgment. Their enhanced standing within the profession
rests on this claim. It qualifies fears of inside counsel being captured by
their corporate employers, suggesting that corporations normally require
inside counsel to make decisions in accordance with proper professional
judgment. This affirms inside counsel's increasing professional standing;
they are exercising their professional judgment and thereby influencing
corporate political choices. I am interested in the meaning of inside counsel's
enhanced corporate and professional standing. What are its political and
ethical implications? Do inside counsel lay claim to power over their client's
political choices? Does their power extend beyond preventing corporate
illegalities, and reach the choice between the various legally proper goals
and commitments the corporation might adopt? What needs for legal service
lead corporations to hire and empower inside counsel? Assuming that
professional standing ought to comport with professional ethics, to what is
the profession committed by granting increased status to inside counsel?
("At one time, studies indicated" low status (citing Slovak, Giving and Getting Respect:
Prestige and Stratification in a Legal Elite, 1980 AM. B. FouN. REs. J. 31)). Yet in 1955,
Berle claimed that inside counsel already had gained increased standing: "[A] generation or
more ago [inside counsel's] standing was lower than the supposedly free, independent practi-
tioner. Few students of the corporate picture would today make so invidious a comparison."
Berle, supra note 1, at 267. But see Schneyer, Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case
of House Counsel, 2 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 449 (1988) (cases split on whether the court ought
to treat inside counsel differently than outside counsel); Slovak, supra (inside counsel are
second-class citizens within the profession even though they are the corporation's legal stra-
tegists, and they exercise control over outside counsel).
By setting out inside counsel's justification for their increased prestige, this essay aims to
assist the profession and its members to decide which inside counsel deserve high status. For
purposes of exposition, I will assume that inside counsel's professional standing has improved.
I discount the claim that inside counsel are not performing ethically. I assume that increases
in inside counsel's standing comports with perceptions of their ethical action. I make these
assumptions to describe how professional honor ought to, even if it currently does not, follow




How ought the profession assist lawyers in the responsible exercise of their
power in corporate politics?
Answering these questions requires determining what corporate powers
inside counsel command in their work. The second subject of this paper is
an examination of their work. Reports highlight that inside counsel's new
role includes preventive law practice and their management of outside
counsel. If corporations use inside counsel for these tasks, what corporate
needs for legal services are thereby revealed and what corporate powers do
the legal department and its members obtain? Proper performance of these
tasks, reports claim, justify inside counsel's enhanced professional status.
If the profession accepts this claim, what is the degree of influence over
corporate goals that a lawyer may accept?
In the concluding section, I temporarily leave the subject of corporate
needs to address the question of whether the profession ought to limit the
corporate power its members accept. Some social and historical evidence
suggests it should not. This evidence includes: (1) how the profession valued
its most influential members in the past, (2) the claims of inside counsel,
(3) the profession's changing attitude toward inside counsel, and (4) the
fact that corporations choose to grant power to members of the legal
profession. Notwithstanding this evidence, lawyers and scholars have argued
that the profession ought to limit its members' claims to corporate power.
Corporate needs may be relevant to answering the question of how much
influence lawyers may have with their corporate clients. Corporations appear
to require that lawyers be managers, not employees. If so, lawyers' corporate
power may be the necessary consequence of their legal practice. My claim
is more restrained, recognizing that the profession has power to decline
client demands. Inside counsel's claims to professional standing challenge
the profession to confront the political role of professional judgment in
serving corporate clients. As a first step in meeting this challenge, I conclude
by analyzing how the Model Rules of Professional Conduct does not offer
adequate answers to what constitutes responsible organizational represen-
tation.
My first task then is to flesh out the claims that support inside counsel's
new status.
A. Reports from Inside Counsel's Age of Enlightenment
According to reports, inside counsel increasingly claim not only prestige,
but also power. Corporations, elite law firms and the bar respond to
decisions made by inside counsel. Exercising leadership, inside counsel supply
direction to these organizations.
Corporate leaders report their greater reliance on corporate legal depart-
ments and praise the departments' improving quality.6 Indicating increases
6. E.g., Creedon, Lawyer and Executive-The Role of the General Counsel, 39 Bus. LAw.
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in inside counsel's power within the corporation, the size and budgets of
the corporate legal departments of many of the major clients of elite law
firms apparently have been growing.7 Seeking quality lawyers, corporate
25 (1983) and sources cited therein; see also Corporate Attorneys Going to 'Preventive Law,'
New Jersey L.J., Aug. 7, 1980, at 8, col. 3 (The survey shows top corporate executives seek
more assistance from the legal staff and "a far more active role." "[Seventy-four] percent [of
top executives surveyed] stat[ed] that the legal staff should initiate involvement in corporate
activities.").
7. E.g., A. LYNCH, T. TILomN & R. BERKow, NATIONAL SuRvEY OF COR'ORATE LAW
DEPARTMENTS COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATION PRACTICES (8th ed. 1985) [hereinafter ARmUR
YOtUNo Surwy], see also What Clients Want, AM. LAW., Nov. 1985, at 5, 6 (survey finds
increasing legal department budgets).
Reports in the legal press have claimed that the numbers of inside counsel quadrupled
between 1962 and 1982, Ayre, In House-Better than Ever, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 11,
col. 1 (reporting a survey conducted by the Boise Cascade Company) and nearly doubled
between 1973 and 1983, Lynch, Moving the Law Inside at Mass Mutual, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1984, at 45 (reporting a Harvard Law School study of select large corporations). Chayes and
Chayes cite a 1983 Arthur Young study, commissioned by The Commission on the Corporate
Law Departments of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, of a select 183
corporations showing an average growth of 29% between 1977 and 1982. Chayes & Chayes,
supra note 1, at 277 n.l. But see Pashigian, Regulation, Preventive Law, and the Duties of
Attorneys, in Tam CHANGING RoLE OF im CORPORATE ATTORNEY 3, 7 (W. Carney ed. 1982)
("The ratio of lawyers employed in the legal-service industry to lawyers employed in for-profit
companies has been constant from 1950 to 1970. These results will be a surprise to those
lawyers who have read reports of the growth of corporate law departments."); Glasser, Legal
Department Surveys Deserve Word of Caution, Legal Times of Wash., Mar. 30, 1981, at 13,
col. 1 (noting "misleading data" being circulated because of sample choice and data collection
methods).
The largest data base on the profession, that employed in the American Bar Foundation's
Lawyer Statistical Report, from data generated by Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., reports on lawyers
working in private industry. B. CtU.R, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL
PROFIE OF ran U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980s 19 (1985) [hereinafter B. CURRAN,
REPORT]. Lawyers reported as working in private industry include lawyers who do not work
for corporate legal departments. "Sixty-three percent of lawyers in companies that employed
four or more lawyers and maintained legal departments worked in other departments or
divisions." Id. at 21. Consequently, this data may not be sufficiently pointed to ascertain
whether the numbers of inside counsel have been growing. But it does suggest a different
picture than that portrayed in the legal press. While the numbers of lawyers employed by
private industry has been increasing, so too has the a bsolute number of lawyers. Between 1970
and 1980, there was a 40% increase in the number of lawyers working in private industry,
but the profession as a whole increased by 53%. Id. at 4, 19. Of the entire legal population,
the percentage of lawyers practicing in private industry was 10% in 1960, 11% in 1970, and
10% in 1980. Id. at 12. The most recent Report indicates that the profession as a whole
increased in size by 21% between 1980 and 1985 and that only 9.7% of the total lawyer
population was employed by private industry in 1985. B. CURAN, SUPPLEMENTr TO Tan
LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: TaE LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1985, at vii, 3 (1986).
The American Bar Foundation data suggest that the great increase in the percentage of
the profession practicing in private industry occurred prior to 1960. Since 1960, this data
shows that around 10% of the bar have been salaried employees of private industry. In 1951,
approximately 5% of the profession were comparably employed. A. BLsusrEIN & C. PORTER,
TaE AMRtcAN LAWYER: A SumAR~y OF THE SuRvEY OF ma LEGAL PROFESSION 8 (1954).
Nevertheless, the size of the corporate legal departments of significant clients of elite law firms
may have been growing.This discussion, except where otherwise noted, is limited to generali-
zations about the largest corporations because these "have traditionally been the anchor clients
[Vol. 64:479
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legal departments are beginning to see the merit in setting compensation
"cusing private law firm standards." 8
According to reports, the modern, "innovative corporate law department
. . . plays a key role in the corporate decision making process." 9 First,
inside counsel have become involved in corporate planning, strategic deci-
sionmaking and auditing. Corporate legal risks and needs are anticipated,
spotted and resolved by the corporate legal department.10 Second, legal
work that poses significant risks for the corporation no longer passes as a
matter of course to outside counsel." Inside counsel at major corporations
are no longer depicted as second-rate lawyers dependent on the guidance of
outside counsel. Inside counsel now are characterized as possessing the
knowledge and training necessary to handle complex and important legal
matters. 2 Third, having been granted managerial responsibilities for their
of the large, elite law firms." Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 278. In 1980, 49% of all
lawyers employed by private industry worked at a company listed in the Fortune 500 or the
Fortune 50 for their industry. B. CURuAN, REPORT, supra at 19.
8. Liggio & Edelstein, Introduction: Managing the Corporate Law Department, in MAN-
AGEMENT FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL: TEcHNIQuEs, TOOLS, APPROACHES vii, iX (M. Goldblatt ed.
1985); Berkow & Tilghman, New Compensation Strategies Needed for In-House Counsel, Nat'l
L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 15, col. 1 (legal departments can respond to increases in outside firm
compensation levels by increasing corporate benefits, including performance related bonuses).
But see Pashigian, supra note 7, at 14-16 (salary comparisons between other corporate
professionals and inside and outside counsel do not indicate upgrading of inside counsel
quality).
9. ARTHRu YOUNG SURVEY, supra note 7, at 5. "The innovative corporate law department
is no longer merely a coordinator of outside counsel, but is significantly expanding its role in
corporate legal and business activities. Id. "[D]erived from Arthur Young's experience in
consulting with corporate law departments," id., the survey profiles innovative legal depart-
ments as "examples of the modem corporate law department as it is evolving," id. at 4, "with
the intention of providing guidance to other departments." Id.; see also J. AYRu, CORPORATE
LEGAL DEPARTmarrs: STRATEms FOR THE 1980s 95 (1984) (CEO's want lawyers on senior
management team).
10. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 280-89.
11. The inside counsel who was reported to have said, "[W]e do have a general rule, that
the larger the project or the problem, the more likely we'll go outside," Slovak, Working for
Corporate Actors: Social Change and Elite Attorneys in Chicago, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. REs.
J. 465, 481, was indicating that his legal department was not a modem, "innovative" one.
See ARTHUR YOUNG SURVEY, supra note 7, at 5.
12. At innovative companies, "[s]enior and mid-level positions are filled by highly qualified
and experienced attorneys who operate with independence ... ." ARTHUR YoUNG SURVEY,
supra note 7, at 6. Perhaps the clearest indicator of perceived increases in inside counsel
quality is that elite firms are now recruiting laterally from corporate legal departments. Ayre,
supra note 7, at 11, col. 1 (The 1981 Boise Cascade Survey found "that of 113 lawyers leaving
those [corporate legal departments surveyed] in the past three years, 34 went into private
practice as partners, five went into private practice as associates."Id. at 24, col. 1); Lieber,
Corporate Law: Where the Action Is, in MANAGEMENT FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL: TEcHNQUES,
TOOLS, APPROACHES 23, 24 (M. Goldblatt ed. 1985) ("[I]t has become commonplace for
attorneys to move from corporations to law firms, something virtually unheard of in the past.
A case in point is that of Harold Barron, Bendix' former general counsel, who became a




corporation's legal function,1 3 inside counsel have emerged as purchasers of
outside firm services and monitors and auditors of outside counsel's work. 14
It is inside counsel, not executives, who now retain outside counsel. Inside
counsel also organize outside counsel's work as well as their contacts with
the client organization. 15 And they appraise outside counsel to determine,
at least, whether they should again be retained.' 6 In short, inside counsel
have become actors with power to determine the legal work the corporation
receives.1
7
Outside practitioners who proclaim, in marketing and managing their
firm, their capacity and willingness to work with this "new breed''18 of
inside counsel both confirm these reports and promote the spread of the
breed. 9 Carrying large fixed costs and rapid growth potential, elite firms
have responded to the emergence of inside counsel as purchasing agents for
their services by entering "beauty contests" and bidding wars with their
elite rivals. 20 Perhaps more remarkably, given professional pride, elite prac-
13. Slovak, supra note 11, at 477.
14. Id. at 481.
15. J. AYRE, supra note 9, at 138, 146; R. NELSON, supra note 3, at 58.
16. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERs: THE SocIAL STRucruRE OF THE BAR 367-
68 (1982).
17. R. NELSON, supra note 3, at 263. But see Pashigian, supra note 7, at 16 ("These results
suggest that ... the type of legal work performed in law departments [has not changed]
sufficiently to require an improvement in the relative quality of corporate attorney." (emphasis
in original)).
One general counsel summarized the legal department's emerging role by listing "client
expectations of corporate legal services in the 1990s":
(i) an increasing reliance upon corporate legal staffs with a corresponding increase
in their size and responsibilities; (ii) accountability of the general counsel as a
corporate manager (and that has far-ranging implications for those blithe spirits
who are reluctant to respond to managerial expectations for increased professional
efficiency); (iii) new and different corporate expectations regarding the use of
outside counsel, perceived both from the standpoint of the office of general
counsel and senior management; (iv) development of an internal legal compliance
system which is the very foundation of corporate preventive law; (v) creation of
informal dispute resolution mechanisms as alternatives to litigation; (vi) increasing
emphasis upon legislative and regulatory initiatives; and perhaps most important
of all, (vii) continuing responsibility for anticipating change and assisting cor-
porate managers in addressing change.
Corporate Legal Practice in the 1990s: Directions and Challenges, 37 Bus. LAW. 683, 685
(1982) (remarks of George W. Coombe, Bank of America general counsel).
18. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 277.
19. See, e.g., TMU CORPORATE COUNSELOR'S DEsKcooK (D. Block, A. Hoddinott, Jr. & M.
Epstein eds. 1982). "The goal of the Corporate Counsellor's Deskbook is to ensure that we
[inside and outside counsel] start down the road of teamwork successfully." Banks & Millstein,
Law Firm's and Corporate Law Departments: An Introduction, in THE CORPORATE CouNsE-
LOR's DEsKBooK, supra, at 6.3.
20. Flaharty, Comparison Shopping Hits the Law, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 31, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
It is unclear whether this commercial behavior is commensurate with professional standards
when the contest's judge is a professional colleague, an inside counsel, who can informediy
evaluate the claims advanced.
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titioners allow inside counsel to make decisions not only about "the objec-
tives of the representation"21 but also about the "scope of services [to be]
provided by'"' outside counsel.Y Accounts of emerging inside-outside coun-
sel relations emphasize that elite firms need to be willing to respond to
direction by those lawyers who know and determine what the client needs-
inside counsel.Y In this regime for organizing practice, elite law firms will
process legal work that has been pre-digested and organized by clients' legal
departments, even to providing opinions based on data presented to outside
counsel as purely hypothetical.Y So long as inside counsel assume respon-
sibility, many outside counsel supposedly will cede strategic control to the
corporate legal department, even to sometimes giving up first-seat at trial.2
Whether out of fear of biting the hand that feeds them, or because of
ethical duties to provide the service the client requests, 27 elite practitioners
21. MODEL RULES OF PRorassIoNAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(c) (1983) [hereinafter RPC] (au-
thorizing the limiting by the client of the objectives of the representation). Of course, any
agreement must not involve the lawyer in violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, including
Rule 1.1's competency requirements. Id. at Rule 1.2 comment 5.
22. Id. at Rule 1.2(c) (making scope limits permissive with client consent). Of course, any
agreement must not involve the lawyer in violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, including
Rule 1.1's competency requirements. Id. at Rule 1.2(c) comment 5.
23. At "innovative" legal departments, "It]he department manages the use of outside
counsel and is in control of outside counsel with regard to their responsibilities, authorities,
and costs." ARmi Yotro Strvai, supra note 7, at 5; see also, Chayes & Chayes, supra
note 1, at 290 ("If there is to be a division of responsibility, an internal lawyer will be
responsible for the cut.").
24. J. AYIE, supra note 9, at 121 (Inside counsel is "primarily responsible for all strategic
or tactical decisions [and] is, in effect, the lead counsel on the case and, in the event of a
disagreement in professional judgment, his will prevails."); A. CaAyvs, MANAGING THE
CORPORATE LEGAL FUNcioN: THE LAW Ds'ARTmENT, OUTSIDE COUNSEL, AND LEGAL COSTS
ch. 7 (1985).
25. See Boston Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 79-3, reprinted in
BosToN B.J., May 1980, at 24 (outside counsel receiving permission to draft opinion based on
hypothetical information, if clearly labelled as such).
26. Meatty, Taking the Lead in Litigation: New Paths to Inside/Outside Counsel Coop-
eration, 5 ACCA DocKcui 26 (1987); see also A. CHAYBs, supra note 24, at § 7.04; Chayes,
Greenwald & Vinig, Managing Your Lawyers, HARv. Bus. REv. Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 84, 91.
27. "The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation .. .. A clear distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be
drawn ... ." RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.2 comment 1. "A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... ." Id. at Rule 1.2(a). "In questions
of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues, but
should defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern
for third persons who might be adversely affected." Id. at Rule 1.2 comment 1. The
responsibility for determining means falls to the lawyer because of the esoteric nature of legal
knowledge: Clients do not have the necessary information to determine "technical and legal
tactical issues" because "a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to describe trial or negotiation
strategy in detail." Id. at Rule 1.4 comment 2.
The emergence of corporate legal departments may have changed expectations for what
communications clients can demand. With knowledgeable inside counsel, outside counsel may
have no continuing justification for assuming responsibility for technical and tactical decisions,
but rather should "consult with the client as to the means ... to be pursued." Id. at Rule
1.2(a). But see infra Section III(b).
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do not openly challenge, and indeed vie for, relationships in which inside
counsel have become "the client. '2
Within the profession too, inside counsel appear to have an increasingly
powerful and respected voice. No longer second-class citizens, inside counsel
now are elected to and serve on important bar committees. 29 Corporate
legal departments compete with elite law firms not only for experienced
lawyers but also for recruits from elite law schools.30 And, the professional
voice that once disparaged inside counsel for their lack of independence
appears to have been silenced." During a period in which the profession is
concemed about increasing commercialism's fueling of lawyer temptation
to deviate from ethical standards, the profession does not raise a voice
against the prestige and power being accorded to its members who choose
to practice as corporate employees. 32
28. J. HEniz & E. LAum"N, supra note 16, at -367-68 n.90; Chayes & Chayes, supra note
1, at 290.
29. Hershman, What Inside Counsel Look for in a Private Firm, in CoRPoRATE C-mNrs
AND Timm LAwYERs: A CoLLoQuy 57, 58 (1986) (Remarks of Mendes Hershman, elite firm
partner, formerly a general counsel); Strasser, Corporate Counsel Flex New Muscles, Nat'l
L.J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 3, col. 2 (inside counsel now are represented on the Advisory Committee
on Private International Law to the Department of State); see also ARTHR YOUNG SuRvEy,
supra note 7, at 6 (At "innovative" law departments, "[t]he department encourages on-going
professional and educational activities.").
30. J. Ama, supra note 9, at 42 ("In a 1981 Boise Cascade survey, fifteen top law schools
indicated that corporate recruiting at these schools increased at an average annual rate of 4.5
percent for the period 1977-81."). At innovative law departments, "[s]enior associates and
partners are recruited from leading law firms for senior corporate positions [and an] attempt
is made to hire junior attorneys from leading law schools." ARTmm YouNG SURVEY, supra
note 7, at 6.
31. See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1 (praising inside counsel). In response to the
formation of an organization to advance inside counsel's interests, speaking for the ABA's
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law Section, its chairman defensively said, "We should
examine ourselves, and we are." Middleton, Corporate Counsel Form Own Association, 68
A.B.A. J. 408, 408 (1982).
But see Auerbach, Can Inside Counsel Wear Two Hats?, HARv. Bus. REv. Sept.-Oct.
1984, at 80. Auerbach's criticism of inside counsel, however, ought to be distinguished from
earlier castigations of inside counsel's lack of independence. Auerbach's claim is a more limited
one. He argues that a lawyer who has been involved in the strategic planning of a project
may not be as objective as one newly coming to the project. The problem is that involvement
in a project's planning "involves putting on a management hat that may be difficult to remove
in the legal review stage." Id. at 81. This argument does not depend on nor derive from the
employee status of inside counsel. Free professionals encounter the same difficulty when they
act as directors: "[I]f he makes a decision as a director to support a proposition, it might be
personally difficult to advise convincingly the other board members to review earnestly the
legal factors militating against it." Note, Corporate Counsel on the Board of Directors: An
Overview, 10 Cum. L. REv. 791, 797 (1980) (citing Mundheim, Should Code of Professional
Responsibility Forbid Lawyers to Serve on Boards of Corporations for Which They Act as
Counsel, 33 Bus. LAw. 1507, 1509 (1978) (discussing responsibilities of outside counsel)); see
also Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client, 48 A.B.A. J. 146, 147 (1962), quoted in Note,
supra, at 830 n.161 ("[Professional counsel should never represent a judgment upon the
wisdom of counsel's own acts as part of management.").
32. Currently the ABA is attempting to gain support, both professional and public, for
[Vol. 64:479
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Popular and scholarly reports offer explanations and justifications for
inside counsel's new professional power and prestige. According to one
view, inside counsel merit their new status because of the quality of their
professional judgment: Inside counsel possess knowledge of their clients that
other lawyers-those who practice as free professionals-do not, and they
use this knowledge to deliver high quality professional judgments on their
clients' behalf. Inside counsel can use the information, organizational power,
and trust they obtain from being part of the client organization to participate
in corporate planning, anticipating legal problems and maintaining legal
compliance. Inside counsel can use their client knowledge and corporate
power to provide cost-effective legal services themselves and to monitor the
work elite firms bill to the client. When inside counsel practice preventive
law and manage outside counsel, according to this view, they merit profes-
sional esteem because they advance client goals, bring the law's norms to
bear on corporate action and insure against opportunistic behavior by
outside counsel. 3
According to this justification, inside counsel have gained professional
power and status not because they have gained corporate power and status,
but because they use it wisely, in a professional manner. Elite firm practi-
tioners do not curry their favor and join them on bar committees because
they are successful men and women. Inside counsel's enhanced professional
status derives from the quality of their professional work and their having
become the carriers of professional power into the executive suites. Accord-
ing to this justification, then, the rising professional standing of inside
counsel stems from their using professional judgment to influence clients.3 4
various attempts to reduce lawyer temptations to unethical action. See ABA ComssIoN ON
PROFESSIONALM, ".... IN THE SPIRr OF PUBLIC SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLNO
OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986). The Commission concludes that "lawyers must avoid
identifying too closely with their clients." Id. at 28. At least on this point, the development
of corporate legal departments suggests that the bar is unable to win elite corporate support
for its efforts. Not much hope for the success of the ABA efforts can be gleaned from large
corporations switching work and responsibilities from organizationally independent lawyers.
Rather than relying on professional controls, these clients apparently prefer to impose their
own controls to constrain lawyer behavior.
33. Cf. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1. The Chayes' introduce this justification as a newly
emerging, evolving idea, carried by a new breed of inside counsel. Id. at 280. But since at
least the early 1950's, inside counsel have been decrying the undervaluing of their services and
emphasizing the positive contributions their knowledge of corporate facts and people can make
to preventive law practice and to the work of outside counsel. See, e.g., A. BLAusTE N & C.
PORTER, supra note 7, at 48-49; Maddock, The Corporation Law Department, 30 HAmv. Bus.
REv. 119 (1952). This, then, is not so much a newly minted justification as it is a newly
accepted argument. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
34. Cf. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmncs Canon 32 (1908) (A lawyer "advances the honor
of his profession and the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice
tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law.").
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In sum, this is depicted as inside counsel's age of enlightenment.3 5
Corporate legal departments are emerging from the tutelage of outside law
firms. Their self-incurred reliance on elite law firm judgments is giving way.
No longer lacking resolution and courage, inside counsel exercise their own
powers with advice from, but not at the direction of, outside counsel. Inside
counsel's once disparaged capacities for professional judgment have been
freed from disabling restrictions and they now are accorded deserved dignity
by both business and the bar. 36
Inside counsel's age of enlightenment, like all enlightenments, is depicted
as an inevitable progress. The movement of lawyers into the employ of
corporate clients and client-imposed controls on outside counsel are taken
as inevitable rationalizations of the market for corporate legal services.
They are responses to corporations recognizing that legal services constitute
a regular and sizeable part of their budget.Y Given corporate interests in
reducing costs and increasing the efficient receipt of legal information,
corporate reliance on elite firm practitioners is a remnant of an age of self-
incurred dependency. 38
35. A grandiloquent image to characterize grandiloquent claims. Consider, for example,
the following claims for inside counsel:
[The issue is] not just inside staff vs. outside counsel. Either one can work well.
The issue is authority, responsibility and accountability .... Executives need
answers. They need decisions. They need lawyers who are truly accountable for
their influence on decisions ...
In my experience, the biggest cause of tension between managers and lawyers is
the lawyer who loves the authority but is totally unwilling to take the responsibility
or any accountability.
Bays, Management and the Law: Equal Partners in Business, in CoRPoRATE CLITs AN
THEmR LAWYRS: A COLLOQuY 46 (1986) (Remarks of Karl D. Bays, Chairman of Baxter
Travenol Laboratories, Inc.).
mhe true role of the lawyer in commerce and industry [is] as an integral part
of the management team, whether he is an in-house lawyer or in private practice
and brought in on an ad hoc basis ...
... In the past, management has coddled lawyers by allowing them to stay at
arms length from business decisions.. . . In the future, lawyers will have to
develop the sophistication in business management which will allow them to be
invited into the planning process.
... [Iln-house solicitors ... should not merely ... fulfill the corporate legal
need, but also ... exercise their skills in fulfilling the wider need for involvement
in corporate planning, strategy, and the setting of objectives.
McKinney, Corporate Clients Want Outside Lawyers To Be More Than Technicians, in
CORPORATE CLIENTS AND Tmnm LAwyaas: A CoLLoQUY 12, 13 (1986) (Remarks of Luther C.
McKinney, Senior Vice-President, Law and Corporate Affairs, Quaker Oats Company).
36. This paragraph tracks the definition of an age of enlightenment found in Kant, What
is Enlightenment?, in ON HISTORY 3 (1963).
37. J. HInsz & E. LAUMANN, supra note 16, at 366; Robinson & Confer, Soaring Fees
Spur Dramatic In-House Growth, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
38. Slovak, supra note I1, at 482.
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Today's motto is "Retain lawyers and not law firms." 39 This motto
indicates that quality is carried by its bearer and that not all elite law firm
lawyers possess necessary professional judgment. When lawyers of quality
can be hired inside, it suggests that both inside and outside counsel can
possess and maintain professional judgment and it raises the possibility that
legal departments can control the quality of lawyers' judgment at least as
well as do elite firms. 40 It still may be the case that particular outside
counsel have necessary expertise or superior powers of judgment and that
elite firms must be hired when independent market intermediaries are sought,
but there are no general advantages that stem from independent professional
organization. 4 And the advantages elite law firms garner by their profes-
sional status, for example their ability to recruit the very best and brightest,
may be offset by the disadvantages to the client incurred because free
professional organization both distances lawyers from their clients and
inhibits fee negotiations. In sum, the emerging patterns appear to be an
inevitable rationalization of corporate legal services away from bilateral
monopolies toward a competitive market in which alternative suppliers are
plentiful and may be hired either on a spot contract or an employment
basis.4 2
In inside counsel's age of enlightenment, the ethical advantages that
supposedly derived from outside counsel's organizational independence are
39. M. Sm v s, PowER oF ATroRNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT LAW Fnuws 41 (1987)
(outside counsel viewpoint); Hershman, What Inside Counsel Look For in a Private Firm, in
CoiuoRTE Cumrs AND THam LAwYERs: A CoaioQuy 64 (1986); Maher, supra note 5, at 46
(both inside and outside counsel viewpoints); see also Brill, Toward a New Excellence, Am.
LAw., Nov. 1983, (supplement) at 3 ("Most clients hire lawyers, not law firms.").
40. Wolfram explains inside counsel's increased status as resulting from the move inside
of quality lawyers. The same individuals who would once have been prestigious outside counsel
now are serving as inside counsel. C. WoFRmm, supra note 5, at 736-37. For this explanation
to be a justified account of inside counsel's increased status, professional quality must be
carried by its bearer. It must not depend, for example, on the organization in which the
lawyer practices. But see J. CAnN, LAwYERs' ETmcs ch. 6 (1966); E. SmGoE, supra note 2.
Lawyers of the quality who are now moving inside, it must be assumed, do not require the
discipline of the elite firm because their professional commitments are strong.
41. This does not mean that there are no reasons-economic, ideological and professional-
to practice in an independent elite firm. Elite firms may offer greater rewards, status or
opportunities for developing specific expertises. It does mean that it is claimed, without
rebuttal, that there is no moral superiority to practicing as a free professional. See sources
cited supra note 5.
42. Cf. Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry
into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 359-60
(1985) (in bilateral monopoly, law firms can gain the benefits deriving from client investment
in start-up costs). But see What Clients Want, supra note 7, at 6 (In American Lawyer survey
"109 out of 239 respondents ... still turn to one firm as their primary outside counsel.
Perhaps one reason for this loyalty is that these relationships have a lot of history behind
them .. . ."); cf. infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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dismissed as primitive dreams and fears. 4' The ethical superiority of organ-
izationally independent practice is dismissed as a chimera: "[R]esearch.
indicates that through the process of advocating the interests of clients,
large-firm attorneys come to strongly identify with them. It is highly
unlikely, therefore, that lawyers in large law firms will act as an independent
voice that checks the self-interest of clients. "44 Given elite firm compensation
patterns, furthermore, it is argued that individual outside counsel are
economically dependent on maintaining their clients' continuing good will. 45
Fears of inside counsel's constrained ethical autonomy, it also is claimed,
are delusions. The high quality of lawyers now being hired inside, according
to this view, guarantees high ethical standards.4 Inside counsel who work
within the large and complex organizations of our major corporations, some
further argue, possess the necessary organizational independence to exercise
autonomous professional judgment.47
In the next section I begin by criticizing the view that inside counsel's
enlightenment is an inevitable development. I then describe two approaches
that provide an alternative account of inside counsel's changed status. I
suggest that both of these approaches reveal inadequacies in reports of
inside counsel's enlightenment and provide directions for further research.
Nonetheless, neither suggest what ought to be the profession's response to
inside counsel's changing status. To that end, I suggest that the reports in
this section ought to be understood as broadsides in a political movement.
I suggest that holding inside counsel to the aspirations of this movement
should be a first step in an appropriate professional response to claims of
inside counsel's enlightenment.
B. An Inside Counsel Movement Account of Professional
Judgment and Power
The fact that current relations in corporate legal practice vary, and often
do not support reports that we are witnessing inside counsel's age of
43. These dismissals feed on the consciousness of transformations in large firms and the
commercialization of the market discussed elsewhere in this Symposium. See generally The
Growth of Large Law Firms and Its Effect on the Legal Profession and Legal Education, 64
IND. L.J. 423 (1989).
44. R. NELSON, supra note 3, at 5. But see Brint, The Political Attitudes of Professionals,
11 ANN. REv. Soc. 384 (1985) (arguing that both similarities and differences between the
biases of business and professional actors is locally and historically sensitive). Nelson's research
on outside counsel attitudes and his claim that in an "increasingly competitive market, [outside
counsel] are less likely than ever to play a mediating role with respect to client demands"
leave him and outside counsel little basis for criticizing inside counsel who choose to practice
in "the most constrained organizational environment[s]." R. NEsoN, supra note 3, at 263.
45. R. NELSON, supra note 3, at 250-51 (billing partners); Mundheim, supra note 31, at
1509 (partners as directors).
46. See supra notes 6 & 40.
47. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 312 ("Many in-house lawyers live in a culture
which favors professional independence far more than does the culture of many law firms.").
Consequently, while it may have taken an Elihu Root to say "no" to robber barons, today
an inside counsel is all that is normally needed to say "no" to the organization men and
women who control the modem corporation.
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enlightenment, only gives slight pause to those proclaiming this age. Because
these relationships are inevitable, it is not too soon to "mourn the under-
mining of" the old order. 4s But, claims that certain structures of relationships
are inevitable ought always to be treated skeptically. Many different struc-
tures can fulfill required functions.4 9 And, if cross-national evidence is
amassed, we would discover that variety, not uniformity, marks the struc-
tures by which legal services are supplied to major corporations.50
The claim of inevitability to inside counsel's enlightenment overlooks
alternatives to present arrangements. It assumes uncritically that the market
for corporate legal services cannot reorganize itself again. It is not at all
clear either that the market is as it has been described or that it cannot be
reshaped.-" Outside counsel may respond to the competition of corporate
legal departments by varying their services and fee structures. 2 New inter-
organizational linkages may be devised to facilitate communication. 3 And
48. Id. at 304; see also Slovak, supra note 11. Using broad social categories, "welfarism
and corporativism," id. at 498, Slovak determines that inside counsel are fated to the practice
as described in the account of the age of enlightenment: They will become, if they are not
already, corporate "institutional personnel," id. at 490, even though his analysis is based on
a survey which found that 43.4% of inside counsel respondents claimed to have a narrow role
that did not include assuming business responsibility, id. at 483.
49. Cf. Kagan & Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN.
L. Rnv. 399 (1985) (distinguishing the functions lawyers perform-summarized in the images
of the "influential and independent counselor," "conduit," "insurer," and "manipulator"-
from changing structural conditions-summarized in four hypotheses). Close contact with the
client may be a prerequisite for fulfilling the function of the influential and independent
counselor role, see id. at 427-28, but both organizationally dependent and independent structures
of practice can support close contact. After all, it was not too long ago that it was assumed
that outside counsel had high quality business judgment and the ear of management. Id. at
405-11.
50. See LAwYaRs iN SocmTY (R. Abel & P. Lewis eds. 1988).
51. In part II of this essay, I discuss the market as described by those claiming that this
is inside counsel's age of enlightenment. To the extent this description is inaccurate, there may
be reasons for resisting inside counsel's increased status and power other than those detailed
herein. I have chosen to take the hardest case possible for finding grounds for resistance:
inside counsel's own claims.
52. Cost controls have been adopted by some large firms. Lewin, Fall in Income at Big
Firms, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at D2, col. 1. Some outside firms have found that routine
cases are useful training tools for their junior attorneys and have been willing to engage in
price competition with corporate legal departments to obtain this work. The New Balance of
Power: The Changing Relationship Between Inside and Outside Counsel, Am. LAW. Nov.
1986, (Pull-out Management Report) at 5, 20 (comments of Irwin Gubman, Senior Vice-
President and Associate General Counsel, Bank of America) [hereinafter The New Balance of
Power]. To decrease the costs of acquiring knowledge of corporate activities, increased uses
of paralegals and retainer agreements also are possible. See, e.g., Freer, Taking Over the In-
House Functions, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 21, 1985, at 14, col. 1 (law firm using support staff to
offer on a contract basis government relations work that is less costly than can be provided
by legal departments).
53. See, e.g., Culter, The Role of the Private Law Firm, 33 Bus. LAw. 1549, 1550-51
(1978) (two-partner sign-off rule to gain advantages of independence, while allowing one
partner to move closer to client); Ranh, In-House, Outside Counsel: Can They Bridge the
Gap?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (junior legal department lawyers "joining" elite
firm training programs for associates).
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shifting business fortunes or philosophies can compromise corporate com-
mitments to a strong staff function for legal services.5 4 Perhaps most
fundamentally, the legal profession may reconstruct the market for its
services; any claim that market demand inevitably shapes "the way in which
law is practiced"5 5 denies the profession's power to shape its own market.
To the extent that the bar has power and wants to exercise it to control its
market to further professional norms, it remains possible to suppose current
market practices are not inevitable and ask whether they advance profes-
sional goals.
The inevitability of inside counsel's age of enlightenment is buttressed by
the dismissal of a difference in the ethical behavior of inside and outside
counsel. This dismissal amounts to the claim that the profession's ethical
socialization processes (regardless of whether they are strong or weak) are
not affected by whether a lawyer works in a professional or a commercial
firm, and assumes that lawyers of quality are above ethical sullying. Were
this true, the bar's concern with the commercialization of elite firms would
be difficult to sustain.56
The research denying the ethical worth of independent lawyering, indi-
cating the similarity of outside counsel and client biases, assumes that the
law is more than marginally different from the subjects it regulates. It also
assumes that clients would give their trust to lawyers whose political views
differ from their own.57 Whatever the ethical influence of lawyers on their
clients is likely to have been or to be, it will be at the margin. But, at the
margin, the same research suggests that outside counsel have some auton-
omous influence that inside counsel may not: Outside counsel appear to be
able to draw on the independence of their firms because only in the smallest
percentage of cases do elite law firm attorneys resign because they were
unable to convince the client to follow their directions. 58 Nor are outside
54. Ranh, In-House Counsel Hit by Economy, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 4
(recession freezing all staff hires, including inside counsel's); cf. Byrne, Zellner & Ticer, Caught
in the Middle: Six Managers Speak Out on Corporate Life, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 12, 1988, at 80
(cover title: Middle Managers: Are They An Endangered Species) (firing middle managers as
corporate philosophy changes).
55. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 151 (1987).
56. See supra note 32.
57. Nelson summarizes his findings as showing that "[g]iven an unconstrained power to
change the law, the majority would change the law to suit the interests of their clients....
The notion that lawyers struggle with clients over fundamental questions about the common
good is simply wrong." R. NELSON, supra note 3, at 247, 258. But would this notion be
accepted by lawyers, experts in the capacities of relevance to contain conflict, without necessarily
inhibiting change?
58. Id. at 254 (2.17% of 16.22%). As Robert Nelson understands,
it could be argued that [his data on low percentage of cases in which outside
counsel refused an assignment or potential work for ethical reasons] is too crude
a measure to be meaningful, for it does not include all instances in which lawyers
infused value preferences into advice or made other more subtle efforts to change
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counsel as dependent economically on specific clients as inside counsel. The
argument that outside and inside counsel are equally dependent on corporate
economic largesse forgets that, even if individual decisions are costly, firms
can socialize and buffer their members' decisions, 59 and assumes that other
firms will not reward ethical behavior. 60 And the dismissal of fears about
the ethics of inside counsel because they work for major corporations
assumes, I suspect, too much about either the ethics of big business or the
power of the profession to discipline capital.
Having noted the new status of inside counsel, and having rejected the
view that it constitutes an inevitable development, how, then, can we
understand what appears to be happening in the legal profession? Two
different groups of explanations suggest themselves as alternatives to that
of an age of enlightenment. The first group looks at corporate influence
over the legal profession. It sees inside counsel's changing status as a
response to corporate requirements, and the profession's willingness to
accommodate them. The second group looks at inter- and intra-professional
conflicts. It sees inside counsel's changing status as a response to the varying
power of different professional groups. Both highlight weaknesses in the
account of an age of enlightenment. Yet neither is pointed to explaining
what ought to be the Bar's normative response to inside counsel's changed
status. After describing these accounts, I draw on them to suggest a basis
for such a normative inquiry.
their clients' positions.
Id. at 256.
In noting the low percentage of refusals for "ignored lawyer's advice," I am suggesting
that Nelson's respondents communicated to him not their subservience to clients, but their
strength to get clients to agree with their professional judgments. Nelson's data would have
found low ethical influence for a lawyer who described his work as follows:
The people I deal with happily listen to what I say. I've never been confronted
by a situation where I say, 'This is the law and if you do x, you will wreck
havoc on your company,' and they don't listen. My job is to tell people what
the law is and by the force of my personality convince them that is the way to
go. It works.
Cf. Kagan & Rosen, supra note 49, at 405-11 (informal survey finds examples of autonomous
influence by outside counsel).
59. Work from the 1960's on the large law firms emphasized that law firms helped maintain
professional ethics. See J. CJ sitN, supra note 40; E. SMGEL, supra note 2. Competitive
pressures may have accentuated divergent accounts of what constitutes professionalism, leading
to divergent organizational structures at the large firms. R. NELSON, supra note 3. Nonetheless,
the large firm "pledges its entire reputation behind the quality of the services rendered by
each of its specialized departments." Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 42, at 365 (emphasis in
original). Consequently, it has an incentive to socialize its members and support their profes-
sional decisions. By contrast, the corporate legal department need only maintain its reputation
with one buyer.
60. The support outside counsel receive for upholding ethical standards might be indicated
by proposals to upgrade the support inside counsel currently receive. See Slovak, The Ethics
of Corporate Lawyers: A Sociological Approach, 1981 Am. B. Fotrt. REs. J. 753, 773




The first group of explanations appeals to corporate influence over the
profession. Inside counsel's changing professional status, one version goes,
results from corporate power to determine professional status. Either cor-
porate clients are patrons with power over the profession, or the corporate
sector of the profession has chosen to cater to the interests of large
corporations. 6' A more focused explanation might accept that the Bar is
not generally subject to corporate control, but nonetheless explain why it
doesn't defend itself against increasing patterns of heteronomous organi-
zation.62 This explanation would show corporate power's continuous influ-
ence over how corporate lawyers are organized. The emergence of elite law
firms, according to this view, coincided with the need for a fantasy of
lawyer's independence to legitimate emerging capitalistic institutions. 6a The
emergence of corporate legal departments simply reflects decreasing corpo-
rate need for the legitimation afforded by independent lawyering.
These explanations sublimate the ethical significance of organizational
independence to corporate power. They suggest that the free professional
ideal is the stuff of after-dinner speeches, not social history: While organ-
izational independence might reduce temptation, lawyers do not challenge
client needs. While organizational independence might give elite firm prac-
titioners the status of institutional actors in major corporations, this status
is not necessarily generative of ethical action and depends on corporate
requirements.
In emphasizing that organizational independence does not guarantee eth-
ical behavior, these explanations support inside counsel's claim to a changed
status. Inside counsel's claims cannot be dismissed simply because they do
not practice under conditions of organizational independence. Organizational
independence is an insufficient criteria for determining the allocation of
professional honor. The ethical significance of organizational independence
depends on other factors. Elite firm independence may have been ethically
functional in a period in which the legal profession was striving to develop
autonomy to influence robber baron clients; or, independence may have
been only of hegemonic importance in extending the power of predatory
capitalism. It may be that improvements in professional socialization, trans-
formations in elite law firms, corporate commitments to responsible behav-
ior, or the emerging organizational power of corporate legal departments,
affects the ethical significance of practicing as a free professional. These
61. J. HEnnz & E. LAUmANN, supra note 16, at 365, 367.
62. From the profession's perspective, lawyers who are corporate employees have a heter-
onomously organized practice because they are directly subject to the control of both profes-
sional and corporate rewards and sanctions.
63. Gordon, "'The Ideal and the Actual in the Law". Fantasies and Practices of New York
City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEw HIGH PRIEsTs: LAwvsas N POST-Qvm WAR AmEpsCA
51 (G. Gawalt ed. 1984).
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additional factors support Elliot Freidson's argument about the general
value of the free professional ideal:
When all is said and done, the very concept of self-employment is
misleading in a market economy. In a market economy one's labor is a
commodity whether one sells it to an employer or to a customer ...
Surely the more critical matter is the relationship one has to the market
... [w]hen one's goods or services are so valuable on the market as to
make consumers supplicants, then one can exercise considerable control
over the terms, conditions, content, and goals of one's work. But when
one's goods or services are not in heavy demand, then one can only be
a desperate supplicant of indifferent consumers or employers.6
History is a good antidote to assuming that just because inside counsel
are not organizationally independent, their claims to increased professional
standing ought to be challenged. 65 It was not too long ago that practice in
elite firms was seen as not only insufficient, but also detrimental to ethical
service. As a Wall Street lawyer told Erwin Smigel in the early 1960's, "I
think it is definitely less professional to work for an [outside law firm]
organization. . . .I think a professional man should have contact with a
client, and should not be an intermediary." Another lawyer thought it was
problematic that "[t]he client in most firms is considered the firm's client-
not the practitioner's." A third lawyer told Smigel that the large firm
lawyer's "dependence on other specialists limits independent decisions."66
Although inside counsel might find comfort in these arguments, abstracting
them from the other forces operating in concrete contexts leads to after-
dinner speeches, not quality analysis. Concrete studies of contexts of practice
that include more than just the one variable of organizational dependence
are necessary. Understanding lawyers' ethical autonomy from clients requires
detailed study both of what lawyers do and under what conditions they
make these choices. 67
64. E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL PowERs: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FoRMAL
KNOWLEDGE 125, 124 (1986).
65. Cf. Schneyer, supra note 5, at 457 (the law of lawyering is influenced improperly by
untested assumptions about how "different settings" determine lawyer ethics).
66. E. SMGEL, supra note 2, at 297, 305-06. Smigel concluded that these problems were
mitigated because at the Wall Street firms "the norms sponsor independence" and the lawyer
who must conform to these organizational rules can "remain professionally 'free."' Id. at
314. But see R. NELSON, supra note 3.
67. Hazard, Reflections on Four Studies of the Legal Profession, 13 Soc. PROBS. 46, 48,
52-53 (Special Issue 1965). For example, Karl Llewellyn berated corporate practice because it
"develops within itself a business point of view." Laumann & Heinz, Specialization and
Prestige in the Legal Profession: The Structure of Deference, 1977 AM. B. FouND. REs. J.
155, 205 (quoting Karl Llewellyn). By this, Llewellyn was not just condemning the economic
incentives of law firms. Llewellyn also considered what it is that lawyers do: A lawyer can
craft "beautiful" inventions and can thereby become "a precious social engineer." K. LIaw-
ELLYN, THm BRaMsLE BUSH 146, 147 (1930). Llewellyn is misquoted when his point is taken
to favor a practice organized for less economic dependency. Llewellyn's point is that any
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The explanations of corporate power over the profession also suggest
directions for inquiry into inside counsel's claims. They remind us that
having high corporate and professional status did not guarantee that elite
firm practitioners responsibly influenced their corporate clients. The age of
enlightenment justification for inside counsel's status emphasizes their status
and power within the corporation to assure us that their self-mastery results
in ethical service. The explanations of corporate power caution against
accepting uncritically the claim that "the lawyer who has the ear of the
corporate officer has a superior claim to [professional] power.' '68
But, these explanations also leave no room for a professional response.
If corporate power determines professional standing, then for professional
prestige to comport with ethical action, the profession must wait for changes
in corporate needs. This is clearly overstated. If the profession can respond,
however, it must address the question posed by the explanations of corporate
power: Is it inside counsel's work, or their patron, that justifies their
increased status? This question can only be answered by closely examining
how lawyers respond to client demands in their work. Corporate power
over the profession is not irrelevant to such an examination. Co-optation
is an ever present possibility in what appears to be an independent response.
But neither is corporate power conclusive. The profession's abilities to
define proper service is a strength forgotten by claims that corporations
determine professional status. In the presence of corporate power, the
profession's capacities for linking professional prestige to honorable service
are at issue. After presenting another group of explanations, I will return
to developing an account of the service to which the profession commits
itself in valuing inside counsel.
A second group of explanations also provides an alternative to the account
of the inevitability of inside counsel's age of enlightenment. These expla-
nations focus on the historical roots of this "new breed" of inside counsel.
There always are many ways to explain history. One way might describe
past interactions between managers, inside counsel, outside counsel and
professional competitors, such as accountants and investment advisors. 69
Another might focus on changes in the composition of intra-professional
power. 70 Changes within elite firms may explain the increased power and
practice that obscures the law's "poetry" by "bread and butter" distorts a lawyer's exercise
of craft. Id. at 119-29; cf. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to
Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1084, 1113 n.109 (1983)
(Llewellyn is critical of equating ethics with altruism).
68. J. HEINZ & E. LAuMANN, supra note 16, at 367.
69. Cf. A. ABBOTT, TmE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIViSIoN OF EXPERT
LABOR (1988) (a sociological account of expert work and how professions compete and
command work and status).




status of inside counsel.7' Or, an intra-professional mobilization of inside
counsel may be relevant. One constant emerges from all of these possibilities:
Corporate legal departments' gains may be explained as the historically
contingent result of the movement of various forces within and outside the
Bar.
Describing these movements might help the profession decide what strat-
egies can be employed to resist inside counsel's gains. But, unless it is
assumed that prior patterns are superior, these explanations do not indicate
that resistance is required. From them, for example, we cannot tell whether
the empowerment of inside counsel's voice reveals the inclusiveness of the
profession or its inability to control disintegrative forces. For what these
explanations emphasize is the misnomer in speaking of a very differentiated
constellation of individuals, groups and forces as "the profession." To
decide whether inside counsel deserve increased professional standing re-
quires choosing a standpoint on inter- and intra-professional conflict. The
age of enlightenment by claiming its own inevitability seeks to obscure the
need for the profession to decide its own character. What is needed are
grounds against which to assess the claims of inside counsel's enlightenment,
while recognizing that these grounds are contested terrain.
The starting point I choose is one that views the inside counsel move-
ment as a political movement within the legal profession. In presenting
reports of inside counsel's age of enlightenment, I relegated to the
footnotes whatever evidence I have that the reports of inside counsel's
increased prestige and power are inaccurate,7 2 for I take these reports to
be political broadsides of an "Inside Counsel Movement" to influence
what power and prestige inside counsel win in their many struggles with
outside counsel and the large corporations.7 3 If the Inside Counsel Move-
ment has a central structure, it is the American Corporate Counsel
Association.7 4 I do not take "the development" of this organization to
71. The rise of the new breed of inside counsel, for example, may have coincided with
shifts in power within elite law firms away from the business departments toward litigation.
Litigation attorneys seeking to gain and maintain power within their firms might have supported
both inside counsel emerging as purchasing agents and the movement inside of the powerful
business lawyer. More generally, in an age of elite firm commercialism, it may have been
difficult to maintain the ethical superiority of free professional practice. For example, the
attack on outside counsel fees and the emphasis that corporate legal budgets were swelling
might have induced outside counsel not to place their ethics in question against inside counsel's.
72. See supra notes 5, 6-7 & 31.
73. In a rare recognition of inside counsel's mobilization, Fred Strasser notes that the
allure of the inside counsel role has grown by "a shift in perception promoted by an increasingly
organized in-house bar." Legal departments become more attractive to "talented and experi-
enced attorneys" because of "[t]he much-heralded move ... to increase use of in-house
counsel to cut legal bills" and by the selling of inside counsel work as "a richer diet of legal
fare." Strasser, The In-House Lure Gets Stronger, Nat'l L.J., July 22, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
74. The American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) was officially formed in March,
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be an "indication of the growing prestige of corporate counsel." '7 5 Rather,
I take its development to be an indicator of professional mobilization:
The American Corporate Counsel Association is part of a political move-
ment to consolidate and extend inside counsel interests within both
business and the profession. 76
In short, I suggest that the changing role of inside counsel might be
viewed as the subject and outcome of intra-professional political activity,
rather than as the inevitable development of social and economic forces. 77
I suggest a political analysis of changes in the inside counsel role for two
different reasons. First, it allows for the avoidance of unwarranted
empirical claims. A political analysis underscores that participant obser-
vations may be self-interested. It does not take a lawyer to know that
self-reports may contain and project an agenda. 78 Second, a political
analysis emphasizes that the Inside Counsel Movement articulates "sen-
timents," ' 79 by which its political successes might be gauged.
The Inside Counsel Movement articulates claims for why inside counsel
deserve professional respect and power. What are these sentiments? What
would the profession be committing itself to by accepting them? Certainly,
detailed study of work in varying contexts of practice is needed. But we
also need to determine what indicators ought to be incorporated in such
studies. If we need to take a position on what ought to be professional
values in a divided profession, assessing the Inside Counsel Movement by
its own claims is a valid starting point.
1982. Middleton, supra note 31, at 408. Its membership is limited to inside counsel: "Individuals
who are engaged in the active practice of law on behalf of organizations in the private sector
and who do not hold themselves out to the public for the practice of law shall be eligible for
membership." ACCA, BYLAws, Article II (Membership) (as amended January, 1983). Currently
the ACCA claims that it is a 7,400 member organization and is still growing. Cox, ACCA
Seeks 'New Wave' of Members, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1988, at 3, col. 1. The ACCA's goals
include "[riepresentation of the corporate counsel perspective." ACCA, CHAPTER MANUA 2
(1986-87). The Inside Counsel Movement has been very lucky in acquiring that necessary
mobilization weapon, the press. The ACCA Docket is published by the organization. Regular
columns on inside counsel appear throughout the legal press and BNA inaugurated its Corporate
Counsel Weekly on January 8, 1986.
75. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 277 n.1.
76. Cf. Middleton, supra note 31, at 408 ("We have needs that are not serviced," explained
the ACCA's first board chairman, Robert Banks, General Counsel to the Xerox Corporation).
77. But see A. TouRiN, THi VOICE AND THE E : AN ANALYsIs OF SOCIAL MovEmENTS
77 (1981) (A political movement that controls "historicity" thereby becomes inevitable). See
also id. at 94-96 (distinguishing cultural from social movements).
78. See, e.g., Lerner, Interviewing Frenchmen, 62 AM. J. Soc. 187 (1956).
79. "What constitutes the special character of the study of social movements is therefore
its relation to the analysis of change and social conflict.... Social movements ... possess
both structure-some organization of people-and sentiments-beliefs about what ought to be
and what will come to pass." Gusfield, Introduction: A Definition of the Subject, in PROTEsT,
REFORM, AND REvoLT: A READER ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 8 (J. Gusfield ed. 1970) (emphasis
in original); see also Killian, Social Movements, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN SOCIOLOOY 426,
430 (R. Faris ed. 1964) (social movements as collective behavior to promote or resist change).
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Like the accounts of the normative desirability of organizational in-
dependence, the accounts offered by the Inside Counsel Movement bear
greater resemblance to after-dinner speeches, than social history. Both
offer synthetic, functional accounts of the relation between social organ-
ization and moral-action that discounts the other forces that determine
action. As a sociological account of professional action, descriptions of
the determination of ethical action by certain forms of organizing practice
are "naive." ' 0 Like the alternative dispute resolution movement, with its
over-statement of the strengths of deformalization, 81 the Inside Counsel
Movement undoubtedly is incorrect to assume that the advantages of
substituting inside for outside counsel do not vary by context, matter or
personnel involved. However, it would be too easy to dismiss the Inside
Counsel Movement by pointing to exceptions to its claims. What we need
first is to see what values it suggests ought to be realized before we
conclude that none are realized or that their cost outweighs their benefit.
The Inside Counsel Movement can exert professional power, even if its
claims as sociological explanations are inadequate. After-dinner speeches
are not without their influence. Even after discounting their self-congrat-
ulatory and self-serving aspects, they constitute rhetoric that can influence
professional responses to current constraints. Only if the profession had
no power to define its own direction and mission would these accounts
be purely reifying abstractions. And, the legal profession, like others,
can define what constitutes "honorable" service.82 The Inside Counsel
Movement's claims are part of that defining process.
The remarkable fact about the Inside Counsel Movement's sentiments
- its justifications for inside counsel's increased status and power - is
that they value inside counsel performing the legal work that elite lawyers
once claimed and for whose proper performance the free professional
form of organization was claimed to be necessary. 3 Certainly, there are
economic advantages that can be captured by lawyers practicing in in-
80. A. ABBOTT, supra note 69, at 316.
81. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE Rnv. 384
(1985).
82. A. CARR-SAUNDERS & P. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 403-04 (1982); R. PAvALKO,
SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 101 (1971); Bucher & Stelling, Characteristics of
Professional Organizations, 10 J. HEAT & Soc. BErAv. 3, 5 (1969) reprinted in COLLEAGUES
n ORGANIZATION: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL WOR. 121, 125 (R. Blankenship
ed. 1977).
83. Compare, e.g., Subak, Special Problems of Inside Counsel, 33 Bus. LAw. 1433, 1434
(1978) (The inside counsel "can be and is a powerful force for ethical corporate conduct ...
because the law so often embodies our society's ethical judgments. By training, interest, and
background, a lawyer is more often than not a thinking animal, pretty well attuned to what
is right and what is wrong.") with Lome, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public
Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. Ray. 423, 426 (1978) (elite partners are or have
played a "role as confidant of management, exercising independent judgment and moral
suasion to affect client behavior .... ").
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dependent firms.14 And elite firm practitioners' provision of independent
information may advance legal interests.8 5 But the ethical worth of or-
ganizational independence was traditionally justified by its effects on
lawyers' abilities to influence clients as their "influential and independent
counselors" for those questions where trade-offs were possible between
client goals and legal compliance. 6 Independence was thought to be
necessary to protect the professional judgment of such counselors, who
also are "institutional personnel" who "enjoy access to organizational
decision-making processes capable of committing substantial quantities of
resources to particular courses of action. ' '87 And now, inside counsel
claim to be better able to assume the role of influential and independent
counselor. 8
Viewed from one perspective, then, the claims of the Inside Counsel
Movement are to be assessed by determining whether the movement inside
of the work that was felt to require organizational independence-work
which ethically challenged outside counsel and whose proper performance
merited praise- increases or decreases the profession's capacity for ethical
action. The Inside Counsel Movement can be supported if inside counsel
exercise independent professional judgment in their capacity as influential
counselors to their corporations and expand opportunities for lawyers to
so act. From one perspective, the question for the Inside Counsel Move-
ment is "Does the new breed of inside counsel enhance the profession's
capacities for responsibly influencing corporate action?"
This perspective, however, is obscured by the Inside Counsel Movement.
In the enlightenment account of inside counsel's changed role, politics is
absent, functional homeostasis is restored, and qualitative change comes
to an end. In their self-mastery, inside counsel neutrally advance both
corporate and professional values. Client goals are fixed and known to
84. Practicing in an independent law firm may create market opportunities: Having a range
of clients may make outside counsel valuable monitors of legal developments. Possessing
organizational independence may allow lawyers to capture work that depends on the existence
of market intermediaries; they can provide opinions insured by their independent reputations.
85. These legal interests may be in conformance with ethical duties if the legal system is
ethically justifiable.
86. This point is developed in Kagan & Rosen, supra note 49; see also J. HunsT, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 310-11 (1950) ("In such men as Elihu Root or Louis D. Brandeis
the bar of the United States developed a type of leader peculiarly its own. Such men mingled
the roles of barrister, solicitor, business advisor, and statesman."); E. SBGEL, supra note 2,
at 159-60; Redlich, Should A Lawyer Cross the Murky Divide?, 31 Bus. LAW. 478 (1975);
Saunders, Law and Business: Cornerstones of Our Economy, 48 A.B.A. J. 152, 155 (1962)
(discussing lawyer's expanding responsibilities in business). But see W. HARBAUGH, LAwYERs'
LAWYER: TBE Lwn oF JoHN W. DAVIS 197-203, 263-64 (1973) (Davis avoided affecting client
goals, even when serving on their boards); Rostow, supra note 31, at 148 (a lawyer ought to
"maintain the boundaries of his position").




inside counsel who then manage outside counsel to comport with these
goals. The entire process by which goals emerge through the provision of
legal services, and the consequent professional judgment necessarily re-
quired, is slighted in the emphasis on outside counsel's supposed potential
for opportunistic behavior. Similarly the need for judgment in securing
corporate compliance is diminished by equating the presence of preventive
law programs with compliance. When it is remembered that compliance
is not all or nothing, the precariousness of inside counsel supplying such
programs reappears, instead of disappearing behind the term "preventive
law," with its laden notions that such practice secures compliance. In
sum, enlightened corporate counsel may not be able to remain constant-
to professional goals while performing the services assigned them by their
clients. Inside counsel's age of enlightenment not only denies that organ-
izational independence is necessary for professional action, it also assumes
that the service of honorable professionals as influential corporate actors
is apolitical, requiring only knowledge of the law, resolution, and courage.
On the other hand, inside counsel's expanded role reminds us that legal
service can be political. It can involve getting clients to make decisions,
influencing the goals they select and engaging them about the level at
which they will comply with the law. Inside counsel's claims to increased
professional standing highlight the political content of professional judg-
ment. Our inherited professional vision accords respect to the lawyers
whose influential judgments are responsible ones. To the extent that
outside counsel have given up this work to inside counsel, they appear
to have forsaken much of the ethical inheritance of our profession. It
may be that a lawyer can claim to be "just a law lawyer." 8 9 But the
Inside Counsel Movement suggests that such a lawyer does not satisfy
corporate demands for legal service. "Just law lawyers" deliver services
that require the development of corporate legal departments to supply
essential legal services that they do not furnish.
Evaluating the claim of the Inside Counsel Movement requires- address-
ing what constitutes honorable professional service. Do corporate clients
need lawyers who are not "just law lawyers"? Ought the profession
accord lawyers who so practice respect? What corporate power may be
accorded to those with professional judgment?
In the second section of this essay, I address these questions by
analyzing the work inside counsel perform as it is depicted in the reports
of inside counsel's age of enlightenment. Reports of inside counsel's age
of enlightenment stress the emergence of inside counsel's self-mastery.
But inside counsel exercise their power in response to corporate demands.
In the next section, I examine the account of the market for corporate
89. W. HARnAUGH, supra note 86, at 263 (statement concerning J.W. Davis).
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legal services that supposedly inevitably leads to the emergence of enlight-
ened inside counsel.90 To the extent this account is accepted, it tells us
something not only about what inside counsel do but also about what
corporate clients need from their lawyers. It describes reasons corporate
clients demand and purchase professional judgment. 91
The second section, then, is an analysis of corporate demand for legal
services. But, professionals to some extent can define what they supply
independent of client demand.92 In the concluding section of this essay,
I return to the questions of whether the profession ought to accept the
work corporate clients demand and the power they repose on their lawyers.
What is an enlightenment? Inside counsel's enlightenment includes both
their empowerment and the inclusion of newly powerful voices within the
profession. Both of these may be desirable. But inside counsel's enlight-
enment results not only in powers being exercised in public arenas of
discourse, like courts, but also in the private halls of capital, where not
only the claims of reason speak.93 Consequently, inside counsel's profes-
sional judgment might only emerge from its tutelage "to make knowledge
serve the dominant means of production. ' 94 Before according professional
standing to self-directed inside counsel, we need to determine whether
they have extended too far professional claims and whether their "awak-
ening of the self is paid for by the acknowledgment of power as the
principle of all relations." ' 95
The desirability of the patterns of legal practice that are now proclaimed
must be determined by examining their justification: Inside counsel's
power as outside counsel's "client" and their corporate responsibilities
enables a superior realization of professional values. This requires un-
derstanding the work inside counsel perform. It also requires assessing
the relations that are emerging between inside and outside counsel to
discover how professional values are sustained between them and in their
relation with the client. These are the subjects of the rest of this essay.
90. To emphasize again, the market arrangements favored by the Inside Counsel Movement
are not inevitable. In "managed markets," the efficiencies of internal organization are available
through purchases across an organization boundary. Butler & Carney, Managing Markets:
Implications for the Make-Buy Decision, 20 J. MorM. SrtuD. 213 (1983). Under changed
conditions, internal organization may be replaced by purchases across a market. Wright, The
Make-Buy Decision and Managing Markets: The Case of Management Buy-Outs, 23 J. MOMY.
STUD. 443 (1986).
91. Cf. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239, 241 (1984) (arguing that surprisingly we lack an account of such reasons and
providing one for limited aspects of corporate work).
92. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
93. Cf. I. KANT, supra note 36, at 5-6 (arguing that in private realms, enlightenment may
not serve ethics as well as obedience).
94. Horkheimer, Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung, quoted in M. JAY, THm DLArLcncAL
IMAGINATION 258 (1973).
95. M. HoRK E ER & T. ADoR o, DIL~Ecric OF ENIsGHTENmENT 9 (1972).
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II. CONSUMER IMPOSED CONTROLS AND CORPORATE POWER IN
LEGAL SERvICE
The subject of this section is the work of inside counsel. Its purpose
is to explore how their work involves them in corporate politics. Certainly
inside counsel at different corporations have been given or have won
differing powers. At some, perhaps all inside counsel do is provide the
corporation with information about the corporation's legal obligations
and the illegalities posed by corporate plans. Yet, I hope to demonstrate
that inside counsel's claims that they can responsibly exercise professional
judgment in the tasks delegated to them-especially in their management
of outside counsel and in practicing preventive law-makes a claim to
broader corporate powers: Their work requires that they influence cor-
porate goals and commitments. That is, the justification of inside coun-
sel's increased status in the profession rests on their becoming significant
political players in the corporations they serve.
To demonstrate inside counsel's corporate powers, I analyze their work
from the perspective of the corporation they serve. This perspective
stresses corporate economic interests, not public interests. I assume that
inside counsel's corporate powers derive from corporate needs. I make
this assumption to sketch the narrowest possible justification for a finding
that professional legal service requires corporate power. I do this in order
to highlight that it is clients, not lawyers, who appear to demand that
inside counsel assume responsibility for corporate goal choice.
A corporation may purchase input factors from others or may vertically
integrate to produce them itself. For much of this century, the largest
American corporations9 6 routinely chose the former course to meet sig-
nificant needs for legal service. Today, corporations are vertically inte-
grating legal services rather than purchasing all their requirements across
a market. How can we account for this change in the behavior of
sophisticated purchasers of legal services?
Corporations do not uniformly or consistently decide whether their
legal work should be performed inside, by their corporate legal depart-
ment, or outside, by an elite law firm. Nor are there any extensive
empirical studies of these decisions. Yet, as described above, general
patterns have been claimed to be emerging. 97 These patterns are the
subject of this section.
The emergence of alternate sources of supply may affect consumer
behavior. To some extent, elite firms once were retained because they
96. See supra note 7.




were the only source for quality legal services. Corporations didn't ver-
tically integrate for legal services because they couldn't purchase the
necessary factors. The labor market for corporate lawyers was segregated:
Lawyers who had the ability to practice in elite law firms wouldn't
consider employment as inside counsel. 9 But corporate legal departments
now are able to recruit lawyers who would have secure futures in elite
law firms. 99
Undoubtedly, differences remain in the quality of individual inside and
outside counsel. These differences explain some corporate purchase de-
cisions. But since lawyers of quality now practice both inside and outside
the large corporations, the emerging aggregate patterns in the allocation
of work between legal departments and elite firms cannot be explained
simply by where a quality lawyer can be found. 00
Nor are the emerging patterns in the allocation of work explained by
the emergence of two tracks in which lawyers with some types of profes-
sional expertise move inside and others remain outside. 10 The emerging
patterns do not follow traditional conceptions of legal task, forum or
subject matter. Inside counsel write briefs, appear before administrative
bodies, and handle highly specialized tax matters. Outside attorneys
counsel clients, plan audit programs and give business planning advice.
Work undoubtedly is allocated to a lawyer of quality, but technical
expertise is normally not determined by where the lawyer currently prac-
tices.
The work of inside counsel at the largest corporations has three clearly
discernable elements. First, inside counsel substitute for outside counsel.
They perform the legal work-be it securities, regulatory, mergers and
acquisitions or litigation-that might be performed by outside counsel.
Second, they manage outside counsel. They are corporate "purchasing
agents" for outside legal services, deciding whether and which outside
counsel should be retained. They organize, monitor and audit the work
performed by outside counsel. Third, they engage in "preventive law."
They organize, monitor and audit corporate operations.
To explain the work inside counsel perform, in this section I analyze
the emerging allocation of work between inside and outside counsel as a
"make" or "buy" decision. I assume these choices represent the decisions
of an emerging "governance structure" which the corporation imposes
98. The segregation was due to both material and ideal factors. Outside firms offered both
the possibility of greater financial rewards and the status of being at the apex of the profession.
99. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 42, at 382.
100. Speaking of "the allocation of work" should not obscure the fact that responsibilities
over a particular case, matter, or transaction also are being divided.
101. The one exception is that work, such as the furnishing of opinion letters, in which the
lawyer functions as a market intermediary and therefore requires an independent reputation,
is tracked to outside firms.
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in response to the contracting problems it encounters in obtaining services
from lawyers.102 I make this assumption in order that my explanation of
inside counsel's work derives from corporate needs. I proceed by assuming
that in allocating work between inside and outside counsel corporations
make choices that depend on the comparative functionality to them of
purchasing legal services from a vertically integrated unit and from an
external organization.103
Such an analysis of the allocation of work between inside and outside
counsel suggests that large corporate consumers have found it necessary
to impose controls on those most professionally competent attorneys, the
elite firm lawyers. Why are these controls in place? If outside counsel
provide professional service, what functions can they serves °4
That the leading corporations have established governance structures
for their corporate legal services, incurring the costs of developing cor-
porate legal departments, suggests that outside counsel, absent consumer
controls, do not efficiently supply what their corporate clients require.
Assuming professionally-directed lawyers at the elite firms, the emergence
of client-imposed governance structures places in question the adequacy
of professional standards for client service, at least as applied to large
corporate clients. Detailing the governance structures clients impose is the
subject of this section. In the concluding section of this paper, I turn to
the standards the profession imposes for organizational representation.
Corporate allocation of work between inside and outside counsel, I will
suggest, is determined according to a governance structure that responds
to the presence of three contractual problems. First, under current market
conditions, corporations have found it necessary to control the fees
incurred for legal services. Inside counsel substitute for outside counsel
because elite firms are not able or willing to renegotiate their fee struc-
tures. Second, corporations have found it necessary to control outside
counsel's work to insure that it furthers corporate goals. Inside counsel
have become purchasing agents because elite law practitioners do not
102. I am assuming that "governance structures line up with the needs of transactions in a
discriminating way." 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOm C INSTrrIUTIoNs OF CAmrrALISm 117 (1985).
"The efficiency hypothesis ... is that vertical integration will occur selectively rather than
comprehensively, that mistaken vertical integration can rarely be sustained, and that more
efficient modes will eventually supplant less efficient modes-though entrenched power interests
can sometimes delay the displacement." Id. at 236.
I do not claim that the current governance structure is inevitable. Outside and inside
counsel can alter the conditions under which they contract with their clients. See supra notes
51-55 and accompanying text & note 90.
103. I do not claim that what corporations find efficient is socially or professionally desirable
or efficient. An efficiency assumption highlights inefficiencies. Whether we ought to eliminate
these inefficiencies is a separate question. Oberschall & Leifer, Efficiency and Social Institutions:
Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology, 12 ANN. RE. Soc. 233, 250 (1986).
104. Cf. Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement:
Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 639.
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adequately and efficiently determine the client's objectives for the rep-
resentation. Third, corporations have found it necessary to control outside
counsel because their work assumes levels of legal compliance at variance
with the commitments of client organizations. Inside counsel practice
preventive law because elite firm practitioners do not adequately or
efficiently alter the services they provide to comport with corporate
interests in legal compliance. In short, contractual problems emerge not
only with respect to fees, but also with respect to client goals and
commitments.
In the traditional view of legal services, the lawyer-client transaction
would be planned, adapted and monitored by lawyers. 105 The client was
served by the lawyer being in charge. 106 The lawyer would take the client's
problem and plan a response. As events unfolded, the lawyer would
monitor developments and adapt their actions in response. Implementation
of client interests, goals and commitments were guaranteed by professional
ethics. Points of friction that developed during the transaction would be
either eliminated by lawyers or maintained to safeguard public interests.
The professional ideal suggests that transactional problems are resolved
not contractually by governance structures, but by professional standards.
These standards are the pre-contractual elements of contracts between
lawyers and their clients. Professionalism defines proper performance and
substitutes stewardship for opportunism. 0 7 Instead of the "aggressive
pursuit of individual interests," where a trader cannot "be presumed to
act in the interests of the firm" and is "associated with the 'other side'
and where his motives are regarded suspiciously,"'' 0 the professional
presumably pursues the client's interest, 0 9 serves the enterprise as an
entity,"0 does not distort or fail to disclose relevant information"' and
does not make false or empty threats or promises." 2 Moreover, potential
conflicts between lawyer and client presumably are quickly and effectively
105. See Baston, Control and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 6 J. LEcu PROF. 7, 16-19
(1981) (discussing traditional lawyer control model).
106. D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974) (arguing that the
traditional conception of lawyer control does not serve personal injury client interests).
107. For efficient transactions, "any organizational form must reduce either the ambiguity
of performance evaluation or the goal incongruence between parties." Ouchi, Markets, Bu-
reaucracies, and Clans, 25 ADMiN. Sci. Q. 129, 135 (1980). Professionalism reduces the
ambiguity by determining proper performance and aligning professional and client interests.
M. LARSON, Tim RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SocioLoGicAL AN LuYsis 198 (1977) (profession-
alism increases efficiency of bureaucratic organization); see also RPC, supra note 21 at Rule
1.2(a) (lawyers are ethically required to implement legitimate client goals concerning the
representation).
108. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIaERRcams: ANALYSIS AND ANTrRUST IMPLICATIONS
29-30 (1975).
109. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.2(a); cf. id. at Rule 1.14.
110. Id. at Rule 1.13.
111. Id. at Rule 1.4.
112. Id. at Rule 1.2(e) comment 6, 7.
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settled, on terms set not by the power balances of peculiar situations,
but by professional norms of client service.'
The substitution of client-imposed for professionally-inculcated gover-
nance structures, consequently, can be read in two quite distinct ways.
The emergent governance structures might reveal that clients of lawyers,
like clients of other possessors of skill, are subject to the hazards of
lawyer opportunism. They also might reveal decreasing safeguards against
the hazards of client opportunism." 4
For the purposes of this analysis, I assume that the governance struc-
tures have emerged to improve the quality of legal services that clients
receive. I make this assumption because I wish to assess the strongest
case for inside counsel's increased standing within the profession. I
address the work inside counsel perform as it has been described in
popular and scholarly reports: Inside counsel have superior knowledge of
corporate facts and people and this allows them to perform high quality
legal work. It certainly may be the case that corporate clients strive to
keep information from their lawyers and allocate their legal work to
disempower lawyers, enabling corporate pursuit of improper ends. To the
extent this is true, there are additional grounds for questioning client-
imposed governance structures. But it is the power corporations do cede
to inside counsel that requires analysis in order to assess what the
profession commits itself to when it accords increased professional stand-
ing to the new breed of corporate counsel.
A. Inside Counsel as Substitutes: Contractual Problems with
Respect to Fees
Given a choice between suppliers of the same product, corporations
will select the less expensive supplier. Under current market conditions,
113. Id. at Rule 1.16.
114. "[O]pportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, espe-
dally to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse." 0.
W iUAmSoN, supra note 102, at 47.
The absence of lawyer opportunism is equivalent to the claim that lawyers will not fail
to fully inform the client. The absence of lawyer opportunism is ethically mandated. RPC,
supra note 21, at Rule 1.4.
The presence of client opportunism is equivalent to the claim that clients will fail to fully
inform the lawyer. The presence of client opportunism creates risks that lawyers will be
unwittingly involved in conduct or assistance that is not permitted by law. It also creates risks
that lawyers, who are not fully informed, will not adequately serve the client. Because of their
ignorance, clients cannot judge what their lawyer needs to know. Client-imposed controls
consequently can be self-defeating. In their absence, clients receive the benefits of professional
controls. Clients are protected, for example, by the confidentiality rules, from lawyers misusing
the information they obtain during the course of the representation. But clients are not ethically
mandated to reveal all to their lawyers. Nor are lawyers currently duty-bound to reduce client
opportunism. Their obligations prevent them only from knowingly engaging in conduct or
assistance that is not permitted by law. Id. at Rule 1.2(d),(e).
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routine legal work, demanding minimal innovation, often is more cheaply
produced internally than purchased in the market from outside counsel.
Elite law firms have made significant investments in their reputation.
Their hourly rate includes a surcharge, a price premium, reflecting these
investments. 115 When outside firms will not negotiate their hourly rate or
vary their costs, 1 6 corporations may find it more cost-effective to do
routine work inside. 117 When competition between outside firms does not
drive down their prices, the availability of corporate legal departments to
substitute for outside firms results in corporations purchasing routine
work from outside firms largely to meet the problems of peak and excess
demand. 118
Cost controls also explain why corporations use inside counsel for
idiosyncratic work. The delivery of legal services requires and creates
client-specific assets. When these assets are developed by an outside
counsel, the corporation can capture them by re-hiring the lawyer or
firm. Although confidentiality and conflict-of-interest rules bar the misuse
of these assets and limit competitors who might vie for lawyer time, the
115. Smith & Cox, The Pricing of Legal Services: A Contractual Solution to the Problem
of Bilateral Opportunism, 14 J. LEGAL STrUD. 167 (1985).
116. It is not always true that outside firms win not negotiate their rates. See supra notes
52-53 and accompanying text.
117. Whether or not it is cost-effective will depend on a number of considerations: There
are the direct costs of salaries. Law firms buy lawyer time at wholesale and sell it at retail to
their clients. If a corporation itself can buy lawyers' time at wholesale rates, it can compete
with the salaries offered by outside firms. But, whether a lawyer's time can be utilized must
be considered. In creating a legal department, the corporation creates an inventory of lawyers'
time. This inventory is extremely perishable. It has no shelf life. If not used, it must be written
off. Thus, it is not cost-effective to hire inside lawyers if a substantial part of their time will
go unutilized. Indirect costs also will affect whether a corporate legal department is cost-
effective. There is significant overhead in maintaining a corporate legal department. Not only
must lawyers be paid, but so must paralegals, secretaries, investigators, and other support
services. Furthermore, a law library, offices, computers, copy services and the like must be
bought and maintained. In deciding to move legal work inside, these costs must be taken into
account. The cost-effectiveness of employing inside counsel also depends on the productivity
rate that can be maintained inside, as compared to outside. Outside firms maintain productivity
by linking career success to billings. When lawyers are inside, more subtle and flexible incentives
can be created. As my colleague Stephen Halpert suggested to me, associates at outside firms
don't receive bonuses from clients for their work.
118. Outside counsel are employed in response to the legal department's manpower shortages.
Some work, like due diligence work on acquisitions, requires a herd of associates, not available
inside the legal department. Other problems require legal research time not available inside.
Other work requires constant tending. As one inside counsel told me in explaining the allocation
of work at her corporation:
Mergers and acquisitions work is handled outside. You can't break off a couple
of months to do that. There are always phone calls on my desk from managers
who want my attention. Mergers and acquisition work flows outside now not
because we don't have the expertise to do it. It is not so much a question of
expertise as of being able to set aside a block of time to concentrate on that
work. I can't take the time and let my other work go. We don't have sufficient
back-up attorneys to take care of the fires.
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corporation faces the hazard that the outside counsel may be unavailable
for re-hire.119 By developing a corporate legal department, the corporation
can reduce this risk. It also can improve its position in bargaining about
the cost of making further draws on these investments.
120
When work is neither routine nor idiosyncratic, cost controls do not
necessarily favor using inside counsel. Innovative work may be purchased
more cheaply from outside counsel who can recoup their investments in
developing expertise from a number of clients.121 Other work may require
legal expertise for which the corporation does not have sufficient demand
to make it cost-effective to support a lawyer who maintains a proficiency
in that specialization.12 2 And yet other legal expertise may be sufficiently
in demand but not be cost-effective to bring inside because it is tangential
to the specialties of others in the legal department so that the expert
becomes demoralized.12 3
Discussion of the economics under which inside counsel can be cost-
effective substitutes for outside counsel ought not to obscure the fact
that some legal services are non-substitutable. The allocation of some
work reflects the fact that legal service is personal service. Corporate
legal departments may invest in innovation. Elite firms' knowledge of
markets, industries and regulatory channels may be obtained by a cor-
poration from competing professionals, such as investment bankers, trade-
association officials or business and regulatory consultants. But, there
still may be just a few individuals who drafted the legislation, understand
the full range of transactional possibilities, or have the required mastery
of materials or possess the necessary contacts. To the extent that legal
service depends on such non-generalized personal capital, it must flow to
where that capital resides.
The allocation of other legal work reflects the fact that some legal
service is not personal service. This work "may be performed at the
119. The conflict rules mitigate this hazard by reducing the market of clients available to
the lawyer. Nonetheless, knowledgeable associates may be unavailable, both because they exit
the firm and because the firm may rotate them through different projects. Less often, partners,
who have a number of clients, may be unavailable to handle the problem on the client's
schedule.
120. R. NELsON, supra note 3, at 68; Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 42, at 359-60.
121. 0. WmasoN, supra note 102, at 143, 158-59 (the advantages of vertical integration
as asset specificity increases assumes that "the innovative potential is slight").
122. For example, the corporation will not bring inside specialists in real estate zoning work
if it does not need an inventory of lawyers' time in that specialty. The same reason explains
why a corporation may hire outside counsel who are knowledgeable about local customs and
practices.
123. The New Balance of Power, supra note 52, at 20 (comments of Irwin Gubman, Senior
Vice-President and Associate General Counsel, Bank of America) (lawyers left department
when their work was "not central to the work of the legal department [because] the lawyers
... had no direct career path [and the lawyer] managers who were supervising them were
people who had no subject matter expertise in that area").
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client's direction but [is] for the primary purpose of establishing infor-
mation for the benefit of third parties .... "124 This work requires the
lawyer not to be engaged in the traditional confidential relationship of
lawyering, but rather, like an accountant, to be a reputational interme-
diary who can insure her work by a reputation established independently
from the client's. 12 Inside counsel, consequently, can't provide these
services.
B. Inside Counsel as Outside Counsel Managers: Contractual
Problems with Respect to the Objectives of the Representation
It seems to me perfectly obvious that a description that assumes goals
come first and action comes later is frequently radically wrong. Human
choice behavior is at least as much a process for discovering goals as
for acting on them.
James March 26
When investments are made during the course of contracting in trans-
action-specific assets, even in a competitive market of bidders, the winning
bidder may be able to engage in opportunistic behavior because the
buyer's investments cannot be transferred readily to an alternate sup-
plier. 27 In the professional ideal, this opportunistic behavior is limited
by professional loyalty: Professionals honor client trust and do not take
advantage of their relations with clients.128 Professional rules limiting
withdrawal, for example, decrease risks that ex post fee disagreements
would deprive the buyer of the transaction-specific assets he paid for
creating.
Nonetheless, the need for inside counsel to be purchasing agents,
according to popular accounts, derives from outside counsel exploiting
their winning bidder advantages by running up the number of hours they
charge. 29 Elite firms' interests in maximizing their billings, rather than
124. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 2.3 comment 1.
125. Compare Gilson, supra note 91, at 288-93 (discussing reputational intermediary), 290-
91 (equating lawyer's role as gatekeeping reputational intermediary with that played by
independent accountant), 291 n. 135 (literature on accountant-type independence being required
for the role to be efficiently performed) with United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805, 817 (1984) (distinguishing lawyer's confidential service from accountant's public service).
126. March, The Technology of Foolishness, in AMBIGDITY AND CRoicE IN ORANIZATIONS
69, 72 (1971).
127. 0. WIIlAmsON, supra note 102, at 76 (market processes do not dispel opportunistic
conduct because first movers disadvantage substitute suppliers).
128. See, e.g., RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.5 comment 3. ("An agreement may not be
made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or
perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest.").
129. See, e.g., Dockser, Companies Rein in Outside Legal Bills, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1988,
at Bl, col. 4; see also sources cited supra note 37.
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client needs, allegedly guide their delivery of services. Consumer advocate
Ralph Nader even ran a seminar for big business leaders in which outside
counsel's detailed work during the course of the representation was
lambasted as not only unnecessary to the corporate purchaser but also
an unjustifiable tax on individual consumers when these costs were passed
on. 13
0
There undoubtedly are too many firms whose working principle, as one
lawyer told me, is "Research until you abuse the client." But outside
counsel fees also are not as low as they could be because clients choose
to hire "Rolls-Royce legal services" when all they need to reach their
desired destination is a "Ford." And outside counsel's focus on the
positive marginal utility of additional work, and slighting of its cost to
the client, may stem not from greed but from otherwise beneficial com-
mitments to precision, accuracy and completeness.
Inside counsel certainly can play a role in keeping a rein on outside
fees. They can explain to the corporation why more expensive lawyering
is not necessarily better given their needs. They can remind outside counsel
that the corporate purse is not a basket of plenty. But this is not the
only role they play in managing outside counsel.
Corporations use inside counsel to impose a budgeting process on
outside counsel. At many corporations, outside counsel are required not
only to sign a retainer agreement, whereby they accept corporate cost
controls, but also to negotiate a budget for their services with the
corporate legal department.' 31 The budgeting process does signal corporate
interest in outside counsel minimizing the fees they charge. But evidence
suggests that the budgeting process is required by the corporation for
reasons other than to reduce the risk that outside counsel will exploit
their winning bidder advantages and run up their fees. First, if budgeting
were designed to control for this, since the winning bidder's opportunism
arises ex post, the process would not be, as it is, conducted largely ex
ante.'32 Second, for all the discussion of "value-billing techniques" to
decrease outside counsel's incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior,
most budgets still are based on the hourly fee.133 Third, charges over
130. Nader Offers Business Legal Fee Tips, N.Y. Times, April 13, 1981, at Dl, col. 1.
131. A. CHAYES, supra note 24, at § 7.06.
132. The New Balance of Power, supra note 52, at 6 (comments of Charles Morgan, Vice-
President and Senior Corporate Counsel, Kraft, Inc.).
133. Cook, Hourly Fees Still the Key, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 7, 1988, at S-2. This evidence also
might indicate that the hourly fee better serves the corporation as a mode of contracting.
However, the ABA apparently is not convinced. Id.; see Smith & Cox, supra note 115 (Cost
of supply is determined by an hourly fee in order to solve the problem of bilateral opportunism:
In a fixed fee contract, the firm would have an incentive to depreciate service quality and the
client to understate its problem. An hourly fee with reputational signaling is a preferable
arrangement for both parties.).
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budget are expected. 3 4 Fourth, the budgeting process operates more to
aid inside counsel's search for outside counsel with whom they can
establish good relations than as a selector of the lowest bidder. 35
The budgeting process serves to establish a relation in which outside
counsel understand that inside counsel is their "client." Putting outside
counsel through the paces of setting up a budget, the legal department
establishes its power to manage outside counsel. Inside counsel first
"circumscribe and scrutinize the legal work they refer to outside coun-
sel." 3 6 Then, during the course of the representation, inside counsel
approve deviations from the budget, authorizing more work and deciding
what direction it ought to take. 37 Evidence suggesting that budgetary
controls are weak reinforces the understanding that "[c]ost estimating is
a natural consequence of the scoping and planning process. . . . The
litigation budget serves . . . as a tool to formulate strategy."' 38
The allocation of work to inside counsel to manage outside counsel,
established through-the budgeting process, responds to the fact that
outside counsel may perform work of limited or negative utility to the
corporation. But, the contracting problem it solves is not just outside
counsel's winning bidder advantages. Inside counsel become "the client"
134. As one general counsel stated, "Typically, neither inside counsel nor outside counsel
really expects that the budget targets will be met, and they rarely are. Budgeting is important
almost exclusively as a signal to outside counsel that the client is concerned about legal costs."
Lochner, Comment, 37 STA. L. REv. 305, 308 (1985).
135. See A. CHAYEs, supra note 24, at § 7.01 (selection of outside counsel determined more
by quality of work and responsiveness to legal department than costs bid); cf. id. at § 7.06
("A budget process should: compel planning; provide performance criteria; and promote
communication and coordination," not fix costs).
This point may be driven home by remembering that eliminating first-class air travel was
one of the targets for budgeting. Reading the Riot Act to Outside Counsel, Bus. WEEK, Feb.
22, 1982, at 39. Nonetheless, corporations have not found that the budgeting process eliminates
its use by outside counsel, even though it is a readily accountable item. See Fear of Flying
... Coach, Am. LAw., Nov. 1980, at 5. In part, this is because many corporations will pay
for first-class travel if legal department approval can be obtained: It is a proper subject for
ex post negotiation. For example, "Foremost-McKesson will reimburse only for coach class
travel unless unusual circumstances justify otherwise (if services for Foremost-McKesson must
be performed for the substantial portion of the trip and were not necessitated by the press of
other work) and advance approval is given by the Law Department." PRACTICING LAW INsT.,
Outside Counsel Letter, in THE CooRDNAioN AND MANAGEMENT oF MAJOR LrncoN 29,
33 (1982). I would suggest first-class air travel continues to be used because this negotiation
turns more on whether outside counsel have been perceived as responsive to the legal department
than on who should bear the risk that the overhead of an office-in-the-sky has not been fully
factored into the hourly fee.
136. A. CHAYEs, supra note 24, at § 7.01.
137. "[E]laborate program budgeting tools" have been developed allowing the corporate
legal department to "require explanations and approval for deviation from the budgetary
plan" not so much to guarantee service within predicted costs as to have a "basis for formal
decision analysis" of the progress of outside counsel's increasingly "defined scope of work."
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 292.
138. A. CHAY s, supra note 24, at § 7.06 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 64:479
INSIDE COUNSEL
of outside counsel in response to the difficulties of transmitting corporate
interests to outside counsel.
The corporate legal department's role may be justified by outside
counsel opportunism, but its function also is to efficiently communicate
objectives for outside counsel's representation. 3 9 Inside counsel translate
corporate "understandings" to outside counsel and monitor whether
outside counsel "understand" client needs. Managing the communication
between outside counsel and the corporation, corporate legal departments
can efficiently audit whether outside counsel implement the decisions
taken elsewhere in the corporation. Apparently without inside counsel,
outside counsel often either imputed interests to corporate clients or
engaged in costly negotiations with the various responsible corporate
actors to determine what were these interests.
The costs of outside counsel acquiring corporate information suggests
that inside counsel also are utilized because they are cheap runners.
Rather than searching, perhaps without success, for the corporate actors
who possess the relevant information, need to know the status of the
representation, or can make the appropriate decision, outside counsel can
direct their questions to an inside counsel who can more efficiently search
for the relevant corporate actor. Buffering outside counsel communica-
tions with corporate actors, the corporate legal department also can reduce
the costs incurred by management involvement in the legal process. With
often professed relief for getting lawyers "out of their hair," corporate
actors can delegate responsibilities to the legal department and concentrate
on applying themselves to their perceived primary mission. The
"[c]entralization of control"' 4 over communications with outside counsel
in the legal department can reduce the cost of transmitting information,
especially for corporations, as one outside counsel put it, that "are so
compartmentalized and sub-compartmentalized that you don't know who
to ask."
Understanding the corporation's contracting problem with outside coun-
sel as one of information cost, however, does not explain why inside
counsel apparently have become powerful corporate actors. Translating
and running only require inside counsel to develop "well established
139. Accord Chayes & Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Control of the Corporate Legal
Function 36 (Oct. 21, 1986) (draft) ("The budget process may not be an effective tool of cost
control, as we saw above, but it serves as an effective vehicle for isolating and defining tactical
and strategic issues for decision by the general counsel."); see also XEROX CORPORATION 17
(Harvard Law School, Program on the Legal Profession case study) (comments of Robert S.
Banks, Vice-President and General Counsel of Xerox Corporation).
140. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 290. Their study of major corporations found that
"[i]n over half of the corporations surveyed" no manager or outside counsel attempted a
"circumvention of legal department control." Id.
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relations and channels of communication with key operating personnel
and familiarity with sources of information and with short- and longer-
term corporate goals and strategies and the like."' 14 For these roles, they
do not need corporate power and status. Nonetheless, in the modern
corporate legal department, inside counsel are not only managers of
outside counsel, but also business managers. They need to be "in a
position to . . . alter [the corporation's] practices" by developing "the
necessary communication and relationship of confidence" with other
managers. 142 They must be able to become organizational leaders who can
"exploit the necessary contacts with the affected corporate operations."' 43
Inside counsel not only translate and run. They determine corporate goals
and organize corporate decisionmaking with respect to its legal services.
Inside counsel's corporate power arises because information costs are
not the only difficulties corporations face in transmitting their interests
to outside counsel. Inside counsel gain corporate power because of the
uncertainties in determining the corporation's legal interests. To manage
these uncertainties, corporations require that inside counsel do more than
efficiently communicate to outside counsel the interests of other corporate
actors. They require that inside counsel make corporate choices and decide
how corporate choices about their legal interests are made.
The emergence of powerful corporate legal departments can be under-
stood by considering again the charge of outside counsel opportunism. If
sophisticated business people can't efficiently communicate their needs to
sophisticated lawyers, which client can? Ours is a client-serving profession.
How can we justify requiring clients to hire an interpreter so that we
understand what they need? And, how can we justify imposing on clients
the costs of monitoring for lawyer mistranslations?
Translation services for corporate clients, it might be suggested, are
necessary costs occasioned by the attempt to capture the benefits of
specialization. The large corporate client requires the most specialized,
and costly, legal services. To articulate and implement the insights and
innovations of these specialists, less-costly intermediaries can be hired. If
these intermediaries are vertically integrated within the corporation, the
knowledge they accumulate can more likely be captured by the corpora-
tion.
This response downplays how sensitive legal advice is to changes in
facts. It slights inside counsel's role by expressing professional judgments
as things to be translated, not the subjects of intense negotiations with
clients about the meaning of different constellations of fact. As one
outside counsel explained:
141. A. CsAYES, supra note 24, at 4-6.
142. Id. at 7-16.
143. Id. at 7-15.
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If the General Counsel tries to be an intermediary, it is not cost
effective. It is difficult to have specialist information conveyed to a
generalist and then conveyed to someone who is not a lawyer. For
example, if a client wants to do an acquisition and he wants to have
a feel about financing, I can talk to the treasurer. He is a specialist
and it is better to have a specialist talk to him, rather than having a
generalist from the legal department step in. If we don't talk directly,
it is very inefficient and a lot of information is lost in the process.
Legal problems are not discrete. The inside lawyer can't pick my
brain and then exclude me. A generalist may not know what facts
can't be changed without great problems. There are a lot of quirks
in the law which produce unexpected results. A good inside counsel
calls a specialist and hands it over to them. Just like I do with other
people in my firm.
Perhaps this outside counsel is wrong. Inside counsel might be able to
translate without loss: communicating with both outside counsel and
corporate actors, like the treasurer, posing the questions and prompts
each raises. But, as this outside counsel understands, this is not what is
done. First, in managing outside counsel's work, inside counsel limit the
questions and information outside counsel supply. Second, in centralizing
control over legal services in the legal department, inside counsel manage
what options other corporate actors explore. The basis for this outside
counsel's complaint is precisely the mission inside counsel have: To use
their professional judgment and knowledge of the company to determine
which "quirks" need research, which potential constellation of facts need
to be explored. Surely, inside counsel receive information from outside
counsel and other corporate actors. But, they are not just translators.
They are managers. They have responsibility for collecting, filtering and
selecting information and determining what legal work the corporation
receives.144
Translation is not a neutral process: The constitution of information
nets and the creation of relationships with different corporate actors and
outside counsel affects what communications need to be translated and
consequently what are discovered to be organizational goals. 14 Because
information is costly and legal decisions must be made with uncertainty,
corporations turn to inside counsel not just to translate between corporate
actors and outside counsel, but also to determine what needs to be
explained. 146
144. See also supra note 35.
145. See, e.g., J. PFFrrzn & G. SALANei, TnE ExTERNAL CONTROL OF ORoAunZATIONs 89
(1978) ("[T]he organization responds to what it perceives and believes about the world [which]
is largely determined by the existing organizational and informational structure of the organ-
ization.").
146. See supra notes 23-26 & 28.
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Outside counsel comment on the gap between the powers inside counsel
wield and the explanation that inside counsel are translators. Outside
counsel sometimes admit the need for generating a corporate choice and
the difficulties they encounter in its absence: For example:
Too frequently, no upper level management individual is involved in
the question of bringing a case or settling it. It is rare, except where
the company's survival is at stake, to have real input from divisional
or senior management as to whether the case should be quickly
resolved, whether there should be management to management contact
early on, or so on. Normally, senior management doesn't focus on
the case until depositions are noticed of senior management people.
Cases get settled only when things are directed at the top management
people who have the power to make a settlement decision. If they
could be gotten to focus much earlier, it would save great expendi-
tures.
With the introduction of inside counsel this was to change. Yet, today
outside counsel complain: "Frequently, inside counsel has no more input
from management than outside counsel has. Inside counsel try to take
management's pulse by osmosis. While inside counsel believe they have
a better view of management, it is based on what they perceive about the
company rather than having the question put to the company." This
complaint loses its force to the extent that inside counsel are managers,
who assume responsibility not only for translating decisions that have
been taken elsewhere, but also for making them themselves.1 47 With the
introduction of corporate legal counsel, corporate legal policy is deter-
mined as are other corporate policies: by managers. Inside counsel are
not just communication buffers between outside counsel and management.
They are the managers of the corporate legal function. When inside
counsel manage outside counsel, as an outside counsel observed, "[we]
talk to businessmen for information but work through inside counsel on
business questions." When outside counsel ask inside counsel "business
questions," they ought to recognize that inside counsel have responsibility
for how they are answered.
To explore inside counsel's role, consider an elite firm products liability
litigator who felt most business questions answered themselves: "I don't
feel it is necessary to tell them that if they have had a thousand lawsuits
it's necessary to change the product on my thousand and one. Supposedly
147. The scope of their managerial responsibilities may vary. It may be carefully limited.
As a divisional vice-president reported:
No one wants to make a decision about a small case which is pretty much seen
as a nuisance that the lawyers are handling. Then we leave the legal department
to their own devices to work things out with the outside counsel. If it is of
substantial importance to the company, I get involved. I have a decision that
anything over $100,000 needs my clearance, if not, they make their own decisions.
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someone has thought about that. They know the costs and have decided
not to change." This lawyer has technical expertise; you can give him a
case with low uncertainty about the effectiveness of his advocacy. But he
is assuming a great deal about the client. He doesn't recognize that
information might get lost, that decisions might not be made or properly
reviewed. He is imputing corporate goals, rather than ascertaining whether
decisions have been reached. His service doesn't help organize the client
to confront the problem. He lacks the judgment Lon Fuller thought made
the lawyer of service to the client: He doesn't recognize that the corpo-
ration might need "communication out of channels. ' 14 He ignores the
frailties of client organization. 149
The frailties of organization, in addition to the uncertainties of trans-
lation, help explain why corporations need inside counsel managers.
Outside counsel are not as well situated as inside counsel to determine
efficiently corporate goals from their client contacts. And outside counsel
are not able, at least efficiently, to respond to the organizational frailties
legal representation exposes and to organize the corporate organization
to address such problems and their changing complexities through the
course of the representation. A corporate legal department may more
efficiently than outside counsel recognize and respond to the presence of
organizational frailties. Staff are common organizational responses to the
need to supply information and force decisions by "communication out
of channels."'' 0
Legal departments emerge, in part, to minimize the costs of securing a
corporate decision. And, in securing that decision, the lawyer must
exercise judgment about whom to contact and what authority to seek.
Corporations employ inside counsel not only as runners and translators,
but also as managers.
Inside counsel gain power by their control over a subject area: How
they collect, select and filter information will affect corporate action. By
148. Fuller, The Role of the Lawyer in Labor Relations, 41 A.B.A. J. 342, 344 (1955):
One of the great handicaps the American corporation has ... lies in the clogging
up of the lines of communication. Though communication 'through channels' is
not the fetish it is in the military, there is a strong tendency to insist on it, and
the result is an inevitable distortion .... Here is a significant opportunity for
real service by the lawyer. Without any threat to corporate morale, he can cut
through hierarchic lines of communication ....
149. For a review of the literature, see Noll, Government Administrative Behavior: A
Multidisciplinary Survey, in THn CHANGiNG oF Busn;Fss RoLE n; SocMrTY 297 (G. Steiner ed.
1976).
150. H. WnNSKY, ORGANMATIONAL INTELUGENCE 47 (1957); cf. Ruder, A Suggestion for
Increased Use of Corporate Legal Departments in Modern Corporations, 1 L'JURIsus DE
E mnRPRISE 28 (Comm. droit et view des affairs 1968): "Free and open discussions are possible
and usual between the executive personnel and inside counsel .... In other words the inside
counsel can have a kind of amalgamating effect between the divisions and units 6f the company
and he can thus be a very positive influence."
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controlling contacts between outside counsel and corporate managers, like
the treasurer, inside counsel exercise power. Inside counsel also gain
power because it is their job to determine how to respond to organizational
frailties: How and whom they engage in "communication out of channels"
affects what decisions the corporation reaches. By determining how to
answer previously unasked questions, like those signalled by a caseload
of product liability suits, inside counsel exercise power.
This description of the uncertainty of decisions about the goals of legal
representation and the ways in which choices depend on whether and how
the legal department exercises power does not distinguish legal decisions
from other decisions at large corporations. Most organizational goals
emerge as "political resultants."' 5' Corporate goals are dynamically sen-
sitive to what "satisfies" the coalitions that emerge in, but are not
determined by, the corporate organization.Y5 2 Centralizing control over
legal services may allow corporate goals to be brought more efficiently
to bear on legal decisions, but these politically dynamic goals are them-
selves influenced by the process through which they emerge. With the
emergence of corporate legal departments, client goals are discovered that
are different from those that would have emerged in their absence.
Perhaps more important, the centralization of control in the corporate
legal department means that decisions are made that might never have
been.
What distinguishes inside counsel's power is the claim that it rests on
professional judgment. Rather than hiring managers to decide corporate
goals in legal service, the Inside Counsel Movement argues, corporations
ought to hire high-quality lawyers: Unlike managers, inside counsel can
apply their professional judgment to determining corporate goals."5 3 Rather
than hiring outside counsel to serve the corporation, the Inside Counsel
Movement argues, inside counsel ought to be outside counsel's "client."1 5 4
Since inside counsel are specialists in the legal needs of their corporation,
they can manage outside counsel's ignorance: They can assume respon-
sibility for organizing, monitoring and auditing outside counsel's work.155
Corporations need decisionmakers with power to allocate corporate re-
151. "[Rjesultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem
but rather results from compromise, conflict, and .. .unequal influence[.] [Pjolitical in the
sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as
bargaining along regularized channels among individual members .... " G. ALLISON, THE
ESSENCE OF DECISION 162 (1971) (emphasis in original).
152. On organizations as coalitions of groups with divergent claims and interests united in
a continuous bargaining process, see R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAvIoRAL T)EORY OF THE
Fnus 27 (1963); F. KAsT & J. ROsENzEWi, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT: A SYsTEMS AND
CONTINGENCY APPROACH 41-42 (3d ed. 1979).
153. See supra note 6.
154. See supra note 28.
155. See Slovak, supra note 11, at 481.
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sources in response to its legal problems and they are best served, the
Inside Counsel Movement claims, by hiring members of the legal profes-
sion whose judgment is enhanced by knowledge of corporate facts and
people.15 6
Whether these claims are justified, reported corporate demand for inside
counsel services supports them. Corporations appear to need lawyers to
manage their legal representations. Corporations appear to demand that
lawyers decide corporate goals for their representations and cede power
to lawyers to determine how these political resultants are to be reached.
Whether this corporate demand and corporate power are compatible with
professional responsibilities is discussed in the concluding sections of this
essay.
C. Inside Counsel as Preventive Law Practitioners: Contracting
Problems with Respect to Corporate Commitments
As in the management of outside counsel, in preventive law practice,
corporations rely on inside counsel to implement and determine corporate
interests. 57 At one level, the analysis of the corporate power involved in
this work seems more direct: Lawyers practicing preventive law prevent
corporate illegalities. Preventive law includes responsibilities for "pro-
grammatic prevention' ' 5 8 and, if violations are uncovered, the responsible
auditor needs to marshall the power to have them corrected.
156. See supra note 35.
157. Lawyers engage in preventive law practice in response to managerial requests. These
requests emerge from the practical needs for planning. See Stichnoth & Dolan, Management
Strategies for the Corporate Counsel, in MANAGEMENT FOR IN-HousE COUNSEL: TECmIQUES,
TooLs, APPROAclms at 113, 114 (M. Goldblatt ed. 1985) (managers criticize lawyers who do
not anticipate problems). They also may emerge from managers seeking to meet their obligations
to comply with the law. "[E]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby
enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business ... is obliged to the same extent as
a natural person, to act within the boundaries of the law ...." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GoveRNANCE AND STmucTuRE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Rule 2.01 (Tent. Draft 1 1982). "[D]ollar liability is not a 'price' that can ethically be paid
for the privilege of engaging in legally wrongful conduct. [Compliance] should not rest simply
on past precedents or an unduly literal reading of statutes and regulations . . . ." Id. at Rule
2.01 comment f. Manager's obligations are supported by the auditing requirements of various
regulatory programs. For a list of relevant regulatory legislation, see Chayes & Chayes, supra
note 1, at 285 n.15.
Although assisting clients to meet their compliance obligations might suggest a professional
duty, even inside counsel apparently have no ethical responsibility to engage in a preventive
legal practice. The initial Kutak Commission draft, for example, read: "A general counsel,
however, has neither the duties of an internal investigator of the client nor ultimate responsibility
for courses of action undertaken by the client." Initial Draft of Ethics Code Rewrite Committee,
Rule 2.5 (not adopted), quoted in Ferrara & Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel in the
Corporate Accountability Process, 4 CORP. L. REv. 3, 14 n.33 (1984).
158. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 284-89. Preventive law includes more than just
preventing illegalities, as th6 Chayes' article and the discussion below emphasizes.
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At one level, the allocation of preventive law work to inside counsel
also seems clear: Inside counsel receive this work because their location
within the corporation makes them better able than outside counsel to
maintain the various lines of communication that uncover questionable
practices.'5 9 Inside counsel's superior abilities derive from their general
knowledge of corporate facts and people. It also derives from the likeli-
hood that more disclosures will be made to them because other corporate
actors assume they share common loyalties. As one inside counsel put it:
"An outside lawyer simply could not move freely within a corporate
structure any more than an alien substance can be tolerated by the human
body."' 60
This understanding of inside counsel's preventive law practice, however,
mischaracterizes both the power inside counsel exercise and the reason
they are preferred to outside counsel. Inside counsel are not policemen.
It is a mistake to describe the lawyer's mandate and the corporate goal
as "comprehensive compliance."'16' Preventive law practice involves not
only the question of whether illegalities will be prevented, but also at
what level the corporation will comply. This requires the lawyer to act
less "in the role of a policeman . . . than an ally in an effort to run the
company profitably and legally."' 62
The practice of preventive law requires the lawyer to enter the corporate
process where the balancing of corporate interests occurs. The allocation
of this work to inside counsel derives from not only their access to
corporate lines of communication, but also their understanding of the
corporation's levels of commitment to legal compliance and their involve-
ment in the processes by which these commitments are formed and
changed. To have a preventive law program, then, corporations ought
159. Inside counsel stress that they are engaged in preventive law because of their "familiarity
with the company" and "flexibility." Chayes & Chayes, supra note I, at 293 (survey result).
This allocation also may be explained by the fact that, until recently, there has not been
much push for preventive legal practice by outside counsel: "[O]utside counsel's desire to
avoid the appearance of generating business may deter outside counsel from taking an active
role in anticipating legal problems and suggesting preventive measures even when outside
counsel is charged with overall responsibility for the corporation's legal affairs." Special
Committee on Management and Organization of the Practice of the Profession, The Manage-
ment and Organization of a Corporation's Legal Affairs, in MANAGEMENT FOR IN-HOUSE
COUNsEL: TEcmnQuEs, TooLs, APPROACHES at 71 (M. Goldblatt ed. 1985).
160. Forrow, The Corporate Law Department: Counsel to the Entity, 34 Bus. LAW. 1797,
1812 (1979).
161. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 289.
162. Beckenstein & Gabel, Antitrust Compliance: Results of a Survey of Legal Opinion, 51
ANTITUST L.J. 459, 477 (1983). Not only inside counsel, but all other internal auditors work
best as allies, not policemen. See L. SAWYER, THE MANAGER AND T MODERN INTERNAL
AUDIrrOR: A PROBLEM SOLVING PARTNERSHIP 5 (1979) ("The time has come for the internal
auditor to equip himself to be more than an after-the-fact critic and to become at last a
counselor and advisor to the treadmilling problem-beset manager.").
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not, and many don't, employ the "veto power of counsel."163 Instead
they rely on developing the political power of a corporate constituent, its
legal department.
The essential point about legal auditing is that when the corporation is
committed to legal compliance, lawyers are not involved in auditing. 164
While lawyers, both inside and outside, may be involved in designing
compliance programs, given uncontested corporate commitments, auditing
passes to functional specialists: accountants, product liability, safety,
environmental and other specialists. These specialists can better carry the
obligations of detecting and policing violations. 16
Lawyers are involved in preventive law practice when corporate com-
mitments become contestable. This may occur because particular needs
suggest seeking a variance from the corporate or legal standards, current
operations are revealed to carry more risks than anticipated, or the
corporation's commitments otherwise become subject to review. 66 Then,
"legal and business issues go hand in hand and are inextricably inter-
163. Beckenstein & Gabel, supra note 162, at 463; cf. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GoiNG iY
THE BooK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 79-80 (1982).
[The tendency of businessmen [is] to think of regulation as an ongoing process
of encountering problems and searching for cost-effective solutions.... Accus-
tomed to trying to achieve their goals in the face of competing concerns of other
departments and workers, managers expect the problem solving to proceed
through negotiation and compromise, according to a 'morality of cooperation,'
rather than by legal fiat.
Id.
164. Cf. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 287 (For "[e]nvironmenta, safety, and various
employee programs ... lawyers may be partially supplemented or wholly supplanted by
nonlegal staff.").
165. See, e.g., Giannotti, The Environmental Assessment Program, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 21,
1983, at 14, col. 1. But see A. CHAY s, supra note 24, at 6-7 ("No company has enough
lawyers to implement the many programs that ought to reach to the tips of business operations.
Therefore, in every program, non-legal personnel are relied upon for implementation.").
166. Giannotti, supra note 165. Giannotti lists the following matters in which the legal
department becomes involved:
* a variance in environmental standards or requirements affecting facilities or
operations
* adverse publicity or adverse community relations
* notices of violation or advisory actions by regulatory agencies regarding envi-
ronmental control matters or permit compliance
* legal actions, either by or against the company
* identified risks to the environment
* interference with continued production or marketing of any product because
of environmental considerations
* substantial incremental expenditures or loss of business related to events or
situations caused by environmental considerations
* problems where a technical solution exists, but which would impose a significant
financial burden threatening the financial viability of the facility or operations
* problems where the staff cannot identify either remedial technology or cost of
correction.
Id. at col. 2-3.
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twined.''167 When lawyers engage in preventive law auditing, they face
conflicts between managerial definitions of corporate interests, managerial
incentives and contestable corporate policies. 6 8
In response to conflicts about corporate commitments to compliance,
lawyers respond with three broad categories of controls. 169 Lawyers prac-
tice preventive law by: (1) reducing managerial discretion by integrating
the compliance program with the company's incentive system and standard
operating procedures; (2) maintaining managerial discretion but incor-
porating educational programs to inform managers of legal risks;'70 and
(3) conditioning managerial discretion by supplying counselors when de-
cisions are made.' 7' The corporation's need for managerial discretion and
its attitude toward legal risk, not the technical law, determine which type
of control is employed. 72
167. R. JONES, PRACTICE PREVENTIVE CORPORATE LAW 74 (1985). Consequently, lawyers
must engage, according to March and Simon's distinction, not in "bargaining" but in
"politics." In "bargaining," the differences between the goals of the parties are assumed to
be irreconcilable. In "politics," goals are assumed to be complex and lawyers can have
influence because they engage in conflict that "legitimizes [the] heterogeneity of [corporate]
goals." J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 131 (1959).
168. For example, a lawyer is called in after a non-lawyer technical specialist has provided
a manager with one interpretation of legal requirements, and one or the other is seeking a
second opinion. The problem for the lawyer is to maintain managerial initiative without
compromising corporate compliance commitments. Sometimes, increasing technical certainty
about legal requirements will resolve the dispute. Normally, however, the lawyer is called in
because the incentives facing the manager and the specialist differ, indicating contested
corporate goals. At issue is a corporate decision about what risks to take or costs to incur. A
corporate policy is being decided.
169. Cf. Gruner, Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Counsel: An Information Proc-
essing Analysis, 9 J. CORP. L. 217, 230 (1984) (distinguishing rules that mandate action,
training programs and consultation procedures). The varied and shifting determinants of
managerial discretion require that the legal department be flexible in its choice of auditing
modes. Hence, there is a great deal of role ambiguity about what lawyers should do in
preventive law practice. J. DONNELL, Tim CORPORATE COUNSEL: A ROLE STUDY 173 (1970).
170. Gavin, The Educational Function of a Corporate Legal Department, 16 Bus. LAW.
370, 372 (1961).
171. Corporate legal departments often emphasize that their most important function is to
facilitate consultation with managers. See, e.g., Aibel, Successful Teaming of Inside and
Outside Counsel to Serve the Corporate Client, 38 Bus. LAW. 1587, 1588 (1983).
172. This determination is not necessarily related to a choice to violate the law. Most often,
it is related to corporate needs for adaptiveness:
The in-house counsel at Biogen explained that if protecting the company's
intellectual property were his only concern, employees would not be permitted
to write academic papers or speak at conferences. "But the reason we can attract
such high-calibre scientists," he said, "is that we run the place like a university-
we let our employees publish and talk. This freer atmosphere makes for a more
difficult legal situation, no doubt about it, but it's essential from a business
perspective. It sure would be a lot easier for me to say, 'No way.' Instead, I
make a decision every time the issue comes up."




Inside counsel are allocated the practice of preventive law because
internal auditing requires convergent expectations. 7 3 For preventive law,
the corporation needs lawyers who (1) can bring information to bear at
legally-significant decision nodes,' 74 and (2) can be trusted to understand
the governance system within the corporation. 75 Auditors must be re-
sponsive to the incentives, cultures, and risk-preferences of the actors
from whom compliance is sought.' 76
Corporations need lawyers who need not either play policeman or rely
on reducing managerial discretion. They need this to maintain both
corporate adaptiveness and the "positive alliance" between corporate
actors. 77 Practicing preventive law by instituting "procedures to reduce
management discretion where there is [a] legal risk" is "counterproduc-
tive." 7 Needed instead is "a judgment that properly balances some of
173. Cf. 0. WmiAsoN, supra note 108, at 25. Preventive law lawyers, like good regulators,
must "understand their [managers'] concerns, problems, and motivations" because better
"compliance most of the time can be secured in most premises if one persuades the occupier
of the need for compliance as a matter of good practice, rather than to avoid conflict with
the law." E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 163, at 127, 133.
174. Gruner, supra note 169.
175. A typical legal department missions statement requires lawyers to "assist in compliance
with all applicable laws, regulations and mandated company policy." Fischer, The Changing
Role of Corporate Counsel, 4 J. L. & COMmERCE 45, 49 (1984) (concerning the recent experience
of the Alcoa legal department). It is no accident that the compliance mission jointly tracks
company policy and the law. Regardless of the congruence between corporate policies and
legal requirements, auditing requires "assessing the organizational context surrounding business
decisions and practices .... [Clorporate legal departments ... [must] interact well with other
corporate departments and organizations.... [C]orporate counsel [must be able] to identify
changes in a corporation's organizational structures that are likely to reduce or increase the
corporation's potential liability." Gruner, supra note 169, at 218. The lawyer's function is one
of strategic planning. J. A=RE, supra note 9, at 95. Hence, the corporate legal department
must have input where corporate decisions are made. See id. at 17-19. Inside counsel are
judged both on their "involvement in business area" and "[k]nowledge of company-wide
procedures, practices, and policies." Id. at 57; see also Middlebrook & Groothuis, Aetna
Profile: Managing, Evaluating the Law Department in MANAGEMENT FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL:
TEcHNiQUEs, TOOLS, APPROACans 119, 120 (M. Goldblatt ed. 1985) (law department first to
spot conflict between divisions).
176. Chayes and Chayes are correct: Compliance efforts "reflect corporate style and cul-
ture." Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 30. But they both claim more coherence for
corporations than they possess and ignore the dynamic nature of corporations. There are
corporate cultures, not one culture. Corporations also have conflicting policies and diverging
histories. Most importantly, practicing preventive law not only reflects but also creates corporate
policies because compliance work by lawyers-not technical specialists-is poised where ac-
ceptable levels of risk and corporate norms are contested.
177. Beckenstein & Gabel, supra note 162, at 462. The preventive law lawyer, like the good
inspector, "learns how to develop ... community resources to gain information and support
through the use of a mixture of force and service, threats and appeals to reason, toughness
and teaching." E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 163, at 126 (citation omitted).
178. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 163. It is counterproductive because managers
will evade control that demands "a loss of discretion, a constraint, and an admission of
limited autonomy." J. PFEFFER & G. SALANciK, supra note 145, at 94-95.
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the business considerations with the legal considerations. '1 79 A veto power
over illegalities is not needed. What is needed is the ability to maintain
and condition managerial discretion. What is required from the lawyer is
the ability to convince others about what is in their own and the corporate
interest.
Practicing preventive law thus requires judgment about the corporate
processes in which expectations about managerial actions are managed.
It requires engaging managers, not as an executive with -veto power, but
as a manager among others. The practice of preventive law thus requires
a willingness to alter one's own expectations and work in a process that
the lawyer cannot control. 180 Outside counsel are not employed because
they cannot acquire the necessary convergent expectations and customize
their work to match and develop corporate commitments to legal com-
pliance as efficiently as inside counsel.
By making lawyers into managers, the corporation controls what lawyers
deliver while it broadens the tasks they perform. Inside counsel practicing
preventive law draw on various resources made available to them by their
sharing "convergent expectations" with other employees. Their presence
and their practice highlights the fact that corporate expectations (embod-
ied in policies, cultures, norms, etc.) are internally divergent. It is the
inside counsel's abilities to affect these expectations that corporations rely
on in using them for preventive law."'
Of course, co-optation of inside counsel is possible.11 It is not at all clear
that corporate legal departments are properly organized to either practice
179. R. JoNEs, supra note 167, at 75. This balancing occurs because legal risks are but part
3007of the risks managers face and the legal risks are no more uncertain than are the other
risks. See R. MMES, C. SNOW, A. MEYER & H. CoLEMAN, ORGANiZAIONAL STRATEGY,
STucTunR, AND PRocEss 202-03 (1978) (survey of managers in food processing and electronics
industries).
180. One outside counsel explained why he avoided practicing preventive law by claiming
that "compliance is a state of mind. The state of mind of the CEO is crucial. If the CEO
wants it, there it will be." Unpacking his anthropomorphisms, he is stating that he was
unwilling to become attuned to the various expectations for the behavior of different corporate
actors that the corporation institutes or wishes to institute. Where outside counsel have been
involved in preventive law, it is where they can ignore the dilemma of maintaining varying
levels of managerial discretion. For example, outside counsel provide educational preventive
law programs. These packages can be marketed across a broad range of companies.
Of course, outside counsel's relative lack of involvement is not inevitable. As one outside
counsel put it, "if a federal judge who enters an antitrust consent decree would require a firmn
of the judge's selection to make an audit in five years and report to the court," it would
change the current allocation of auditing work between inside and outside counsel. "A few
regulatory agencies," he continued, "can change all this [the current allocation] very quickly."
181. Like Williamson, I do not "mean to suggest that internal audits are unproblematic ....
Internal auditing is subject to corruption.... If all the relevant organizational alternatives
are equally or more severely flawed, the observation that internal audits are imperfect lacks
comparative institutional significance." 0. WauLiAMSON, supra note 102, at 155 n.18.
182. For a discussion of the various ways in which internal auditors may foster illegalities,
see Marx, Ironies of Social Control: Authorities as Contributors to Deviance through Esca-
lation, Nonenforcement and Covert Facilitation, 28 Soc. PROBS. 221 (1981).
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preventive law or manage outside counsel in accordance with professional
duties. Both areas of work force them to confront the moral dilemmas of
practice. Further research is needed on the actual contexts of their practice
before we can understand the quality of professional judgment exercised by
inside counsel who lack organizational independence. But it is clear that their
work necessarily involves them in influencing corporate goals and commit-
ments. And for this work to be done properly, inside counsel need the power
to mobilize corporate decisionmaking processes and to negotiate about the
trade-offs between legal compliance and corporate goals. Whether or not inside
counsel actually satisfy the ethical charge imposed on them, the Inside Counsel
Movement describes lawyering in which professional judgment both is a
political force in the corporations served and is backed, not only by the force
of law, but by inside counsel having attained corporate power.
III. "WHO IS THE CLIENT?" AS A QUESTION OF PROFESSIONAL
JURISDICTION
A. The Challenge of the Inside Counsel Movement
The Inside Counsel Movement advises corporations that the modem
corporate legal department which manages outside counsel and practices
preventive law must be staffed by high-quality, well-paid lawyers."83 Lawyers
who manage outside counsel and practice preventive law ought to earn high
professional status and power, the Inside Counsel Movement lobbies the
profession.'14 Corporations are counseled to employ lawyers for tasks that
require making mixed law/business decisions. 85 The profession is mobilized
to recognize inside counsel as high quality lawyers whose professional
judgment is enhanced by their corporate knowledge. 86
Inside counsel are not to be understood, the Inside Counsel Movement
claims, as half lawyers/half businessmen. They are not half-breeds, but new
breeds of lawyers.187 By bringing high-quality lawyers inside, corporations
improve the legal services they receive. They ought not seek lawyers willing
to doff their professional "hats" for business ones.' They need high
quality lawyers whose advice improves with organizational involvement.
The Inside Counsel Movement depends on the claims that managing
outside counsel and practicing preventive law are legal tasks: Developing
183. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
185. R. JoNEs, supra note 167, at 74-75.
186. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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corporate goals and commitments are part of corporate legal practice. The
enlightened inside counsel knows that for legal work, as for the work of
other professions, "technical autonomy contains within itself the right,
indeed, the necessity, to perform supervisory and policy-making func-
tions."'189 Their involvement in business need not compromise their profes-
sional standing because managing outside counsel and other corporate actors
"are not intrinsically managerial tasks but rather tasks intrinsic to discre-
tionary work."'' 9 It is not because inside counsel are managers, but because
they are lawyers that they must "formulate, determine and effectuate
management policies."' 9' In other words, the Inside Counsel Movement is
advancing a "jurisdictional claim": Managing outside counsel and practicing
preventive law are within the legal profession's "jurisdiction."'
The extent of this jurisdictional claim requires an inspection of the tasks
that are an intrinsic part of the work the Inside Counsel Movement claims.
Managers of outside counsel are not just translators and runners. Practi-
tioners of preventive law are not just policemen. As the two previous
sections explained, both are participants in the political process through
which the corporation chooses its goals. Managers of outside counsel
communicate out of channels and constitute channels for communication
and decisionmaking. Preventive law practitioners restructure expectations
about the strategic importance of legal contingencies. In order to accomplish
the work for which they are employed, inside counsel need to be "institu-
tional personnel," empowered by their corporations to be involved in
formulating, influencing and implementing corporate goals and commit-
189. E. FREmSON, supra note 64, at 154.
Professional employees possess technical autonomy or the right to use discretion
and judgment in the performance of their work. In order actually to exercise
that technical autonomy during the course of work they must from time to time
be able to exercise some degree of both supervisory and policy-making authority.
Furthermore, within certain limits, they must be able to select the work they do
and decide how to do it.
Id.
190. Id. at 149.
191. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) (as test to determine whether employee
is a manager or a proper member of a rank and file bargaining unit), cited with approval in
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 276 (1974). Freidson argues that since professional
work requires some supervisory and policy-making authority, see supra note 189, labor law
ought not use the power "to formulate, determine and effectuate management policies" as
the test of whether a professional is an employee or a manager. E. FamRDSON, supra note 64,
at 152-55. Instead, he suggests that the test ought to be whether the professional has power
over "resource allocation decisions." Id. at 154.
192. Andrew Abbott introduces the concept of jurisdiction to explore the shifting links
between professions and the tasks they carry out: "For some, the relation between professions
and their work is simple. There is a map of tasks to be done and an isomorphic map of
people doing them. Function is structure. But the reality is more complex; the tasks, the
professions, and the links between them change continually." A. ABBotr, supra note 69, at
35. Jurisdictional claims argue that certain tasks ought to be allocated, sometimes exclusively,
to a particular profession. Id. at 59.
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ments and "capable of committing substantial quantities of resources to
particular courses of action."1 93
Inside counsel may be organizationally dependent, but not, the Inside
Counsel Movement claims, thereby less worthy of professional praise. Not
kept, not tame, not house-broken, but enlightened: Inside counsel use their
professional judgment, enhanced by their understanding of corporate needs,
to autonomously evaluate and influence the corporation that employs them.
Members of the corporate legal department are not professional employees,
who might deserve to be treated as second-class citizens within the profes-
sion. They are professionals with the power of managers, able if necessary
to affirm their professional responsibilities and alter their corporation's
"resource allocation decisions."' 94 Without such corporate power, they
would be "helpless and dependent because they [would] have no control
over the "economy" of the organization that employs them."' 95 But they
attain such power because their work necessarily involves them in how the
corporation selects its goals and commitments. And, because they are staff
with power, they can be so involved, without compromising their profes-
sional ethics.' 96
Analysis of the work inside counsel prize reveals that a broad and
ambitious jurisdictional claim for the legal profession is being advanced by
the Inside Counsel Movement. In claiming that lawyers ought to manage
outside counsel and practice preventive law, the Inside Counsel Movement
claims that legal practice includes work in which lawyers use their judgment
193. Slovak, supra note 11, at 471, 490.
[Tihe general counsel [is one of an] organization's institutional personnel [who]
act as articulators of their own organization to those others who constitute the
relevant social environment. More specifically, such personnel face both inward
and outward vis-a-vis their own organizations; they must plead for, negotiate,
and perhaps seize resources and positions for their organizations in the larger
social structure while they simultaneously counsel, direct, and demand from their
own organizations sufficient levels of performance to attain their goals with
normatively prescribed means.
Id. at 490.
194. E. FRamsoN, supra note 64, at 154 (offering test for deciding if professional is
supervisor, and not a proper member of the employees' bargaining unit).
195. Id. at 155; cf. M. LARSON, supra note 107, at 27-28. Like inside counsel, salaried
engineers engaged new tasks:
[T]he function of the engineer was dual, at once technical and economic. Cost
being an inherent criterion of the 'rightness of the technical solution,' the civil
engineer was expected to advise on the practicability and profitability of new
projects, and sometimes he was also expected to engage in promotional activities.
Id. at 27. But, engineers usually performed these functions as subordinate employees. Id. at
28.
196. Cf. Goldner & Ritti, Professionalization as Career Immobility, 72 Am. J. Soc. 489
(1967) (corporate engineers claiming power to affect corporate goals). For a discussion of the
various ways in which staffs obtain power over "the line," see D. KATz & R. KAHN, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1966); R. GOLEMEMaWSKI, ORGANIZING MEN AND
PoWER: PATrEPNS OF BEHAVIOR AND THE LINE-STAFF MODELS (1967).
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for altering their clients' objectives, not just for carrying out orders from
clients. Inside counsel, in other words, lay claim to the jurisdiction of the
"influential and independent counselor."' 197
If this jurisdictional claim is a "radical" one, 19 it apparently is one which
is accepted by the elite business community. According to reports, the large
corporations increasingly rely on and trust lawyers' judgment, especially
inside counsel's, over a wide range of issues. 199 Corporations cede to lawyers
supervisory and managerial responsibilities for their legal function." They
include lawyers in the groups choosing their strategic plans. That corpora-
tions employ lawyers-whether they hire outside or inside counsel-to
practice as "influential and independent counselors" apparently indicates
corporate need for a legal profession that assumes jurisdiction to engage in
"diagnosis, inference, and treatment"2'' of corporate goals and commit-
ments.
Within the profession, too, there is support for the jurisdictional claim
of corporate legal departments. This support comes from at least three
sources: first, those whose voices constitute the Inside Counsel Movement;
second, those who have changed their attitudes about the professional power
and prestige inside counsel deserve; and third, those who have prized those
elite firm practitioners who served their clients as "influential and inde-
197. See supra notes 83-88; cf. Slovak, supra note 11, at 488-89 (inside counsel as "strat-
egist," outside counsel as "tactician").
198. Post, On Professional Prerogatives, 37 ST. L. Rav. 459, 462 (1985) (responding to
the presentation of the influential and independent counselor role in Kagen & Rosen, supra
note 49). It is not clear to what extent inside counsel perform new tasks. "The [transactional
planning] skills are familiar to business-counseling lawyers." A. CHYEs, supra note 24, at §
6.01.
Corporate lawyers move to less charted waters when the legal planning is not
tied to specific transactions ...
. [T]he trend still is for [inside] counsel to go further than the traditional
corporate lawyer and provide a wide range of [strategic planning] advice on the
legal and regulatory environment-present and projected-that will affect the
feasibility, cost and timeliness of those projects ...
. The programmatic [prevention] approach has little in the way of analogy
to traditional corporate law practiced by law firms .... All of this represents a
large-scale and increasingly sophisticated area of legal practice that generally has
no parallel in law firm practice.
Id. at § 6.02-.03. Regardless of whether or not inside counsel perform new tasks, they claim
and are perceived to be engaged in the practice of law. For a discussion of the various tests
for determining what constitutes "the practice of law," see Note, Is Divorce Mediation the
Practice of Law? A Matter of Perspective, 75 CAL. L. Ray. 1093, 1096-1109 (1987).
199. See supra notes 6 & 9.
200. "The general counsel ... has both the right and responsibility to insist upon early
legal involvement in major transactions that will raise significant legal issues. This is important
leverage." Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 281.




pendent counselors." For example, Harold Williams is not just a zealous
regulator, but is a supporter of the sentiments articulated by the Inside
Counsel Movement in castigating "the mistaken belief-ultimately corrosive
of the bar, the corporation and private enterprise itself-that anything which
is not illegal is within the realm of the acceptable" and in advancing the
claim that "lawyers-along with their more mundane responsibilities-must
be architects of the accountability process which provide the corporate
structure with the discipline necessary for effective decision-making. ' ' 0
But within the profession there also is some opposition to the Inside
Counsel Movement's jurisdictional claims. At least one scholar has argued
that the "influential and independent counselor role" exceeds "professional
prerogatives." 23 But more important, outside counsel restrict the profes-
sion's jurisdictional claims in normatively defining proper professional action
by their own work. As an elite firm business lawyer argued:
Clients want to know what it is to comply and how far they can go in
a certain area. It would be a conflict of our responsibility to the client
if we would factor in their responsibility to the public and it would be
a conflict of our responsibility to the profession if we would factor in
their business realities.
Or, as another elite firm practitioner explained about the proper role of a
litigator: "Our job is simply to advise the client about the legal risks. The
effect of the case on employee development and morale is the client's
concern. It is not ours. Yes, it is important to the client, but we don't
think about it." Why? A managing partner offered the following argument:
"I believe decisions should be made by the client .... The biggest problem
is that everybody would like someone else to make their decisions. I try
not to do that."
These lawyers define the proper professional role by what William Simon
has called the lawyer "kiss-offs]": 204 "I'd like to help, but my hands are
tied;" 25 "I'd like to help, but it's not my job;"2c6 "Things are not as bad
as you think." Even if these kiss-offs were supported philosophically, 2°s
they deny the claims voiced by the Inside Counsel Movement and supported
202. H. Williams, Address to the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law
(Aug. 5, 1980), reprinted in SEC Chairman's Remarks on Corporate Lawyer Responsibilities,
Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 11, 1980, at 24, cols. 1, 3.
203. Post, supra note 198.
204. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. Rv. 29.
205. Id. at 44 n.29 ("the Positivist kiss-off").
206. Id. at 75 n.100 ("the Purposivist kiss-off").
207. Id. at 102 n.156 ("the Ritualist kiss-off").
208. See id. (rejecting their philosophical support).
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by their corporate employers. It is little wonder, then, that inside counsel
accuse such lawyers of engaging in unprofessional behavior. 2°9
In response, outside counsel may suggest that the corporate legal depart-
ment, like other organizational divisions, can be seized by a territorial
imperative and seek to expand the contingencies in which it plays an
institutional role. But lawyers, they claim, have no responsibility to start
influencing the "economy" of the corporations they serve. Indeed, so acting
would take them out of the profession's jurisdiction and mandate.
The Inside Counsel Movement thus challenges the profession to take a
side on whether lawyers ought to be "influential and independent counsel-
ors." If, for example, preventive law programs extend too far the profes-
sion's jurisdictional claims, because they may require lawyers being complicit
in too much non-compliance, then the profession might want to resist the
Inside Counsel Movement. On the other hand, the profession might support
a jurisdictional claim to the independent and influential counselor role. It
might recognize that professional judgment involves not only expertise but
also political judgment about how to exercise corporate leadership. 21 0
It certainly is correct that the profession cannot give its members the
power of institutional personnel in elite corporations. The profession must
battle for corporate power both collectively and through the actions of its
members. Lawyers play a part in formulating and effectuating corporate
policy, but the part they play must be negotiated in each context. Of course,
209. As one inside counsel noted, outside counsel, especially "younger lawyers don't have
a sense of entrepreneurial or client responsibility .... They're dealing solely with legal issues
.... They don't have the broad view. They have no desire to deal with personal relationships.
It's just, 'I'll do my work to the best of my ability, and that's it."' Maher, supra note 5, at
47 (quoting Berne Rolston, former outside counsel). Another inside counsel reports:
I have seen innumerable instances in which the outside counsel has given strong
advice with a clear understanding that it would not be followed by the corporate
management. The lawyer has then left it as a management decision, done nothing
to prevent the action, and continued to represent the corporation.
Fortunately, or unfortunately, [inside counsel] for a corporation do not have
the privilege of avoiding responsibility for the ultimate action of the corporation.
Creighton, Inside v. Outside, AM. LAW., Nov. 1984, at S-6.
210. Professor Post argues that the influential role requires more than professional expertise
and threatens to de-politicize the matters with which it deals. Post, supra note 198, at 463,
464. The analysis here accepts the first point. Inside counsel in exercising influence make
political choices. They do not merely apply their expertise. They vie in corporate political
processes over issues for which there is not one determinate answer. They need corporate
power. This analysis emphasizes the political role of corporate lawyering and if taken seriously
should counter the prediction which is Professor Post's second argument. Recognizing the
political nature of the corporation and the lawyer's role as one of the actors therein ought to
forestall an understanding of lawyer's work in which corporate social responsibility "slips
from the arena of public discussion, and its roots in ethics and public policy fade from public
awareness." Id. at 464. On the contrary, the fact that corporations need influential lawyers,
whose work in particular contexts is open to evaluation by both professional and corporate
norms, might provide possibilities for raising questions about what degree of control ethics
and public policy ought to have in corporate decisionmaking.
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this negotiation occurs against a backdrop of professional claims. 211 But,
the profession cannot cede to its individual practitioners power that it
doesn't possess, in particular, corporate power. That power must be won
and maintained.
However, the profession can choose to support jurisdictional battles. The
jurisdictional claims of a profession need to be maintained by a series of
initiatives and responses in a competitive market and a diversified profes-
sion.2 2 It is a characteristic of professions that they challenge boundaries
maintained by social structures, and the capacity to do so marks strong
professions. 213 As Talcott Parsons reminded us, professions are committed
to authority stemming from the "specificity of function, ' 214 not from that
which "is distributed and institutionalized in terms of office, ' 215 as in
bureaucracies, or in "the 'terms of the contract," ' 21 6 as in contractual
relations. The role of the professions in the social structure, their social
significance, depends on their increasing possibilities for realizing value by
re-aligning the structural boundaries maintained by these different bases of
authority. 21 7 The jurisdictional claims of professional groups are needed to
"throw much light on important strains and instabilities" in current organ-
izational arrangements. 218
If the Inside Counsel Movement's jurisdictional claims are to be main-
tained, support from the profession will be needed. Like elite firm partners
who have become investment bankers, or inside counsel who have become
managers, lawyers in the corporate legal department may find greater
rewards in identifying themselves as law managers, not corporate counsel.
And non-lawyer legal consultants might substitute for inside counsel. 219
Lawyers who serve individuals are beset by competition by lay competitors,
such as do-it yourself publishers and title insurance companies. Lawyers
211. In negotiations between professionals and their employers about the scope and condi-
tions of professional work, "self respect, reputation, and career are at stake.... [T]he
negotiation takes place from a position of professional worth and values and involves a whole
rhetoric of professional claims." In comparable negotiations with non-professional employees,
at stake is merely "convenience and ease on the job." Bucher & Stelling, supra note 82, at
5-6.
212. See A. ABBOTT, supra note 69; see also, Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice
Controversy, A Struggle Among Power Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. Rav. 1 (1955).
213. A. ABBOTT, supra note 69, at 280-314. One justification for unauthorized practice of
law enforcement is that a strong profession guards against encroachments. See Johnstone,
supra note 212. Of course, client interests might suggest that some work ought to leave the
profession's jurisdiction.
214. T. PARsoNs, The Professions and Social Structure, in EssAYs N SocIoLoIcAL THEORY
38 (Rev. ed. 1954).
215. Id. at 39.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 47-49.
218. Id. at 49.
219. One lesson from Japan is that a bar can be organized so that only the smallest
percentage of law graduates become lawyers.
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who serve corporations also face sophisticated competition from manage-
ment consultants, investment bankers, accountants, safety engineers, and
the managers with whom they deal, among others. It ought not to be
forgotten that not too long ago in the history of the profession it was
opined that "[p]robably in the aggregate more investment advice is given
by lawyers than by all other advisors combined." m
At the least, the Inside Counsel Movement challenges the profession to
decide whether to include service as corporate institutional actors within the
elite lawyer's "self-concept" and "image."' The inclusion of this role is
maintained by the rising status of inside counsel. It also is maintained by
identifying outside counsel with the clients they serve (for example, Cov-
ington & Burling is not South African Airway's firm).m But it is at risk
where the kiss-offs are taken to normatively define the profession's juris-
dictional claims.
The challenge of the Inside Counsel Movement can be seen in miniature
by focusing on the appellation it prefers to that of inside counsel: "corporate
counsel." 'z This name has a denotation that extends beyond members of
corporate legal departments. Those elite firm practitioners who serve on
corporate boards of directors sometimes also are called "corporate coun-
sel."22
In the period in which inside counsel claim to be "corporate counsel,"
it is increasingly urged that outside counsel "should cherish our independent
judgment to the utmost, and that independence is impaired if we become
a director of a company of which we are also counsel.' '"- To protect
themselves from temptations, outside counsel are urged to withdraw from
corporate boards. 6 The integrity of the profession seems to be strengthened
when outside counsel protect their independence and refuse to serve on
corporate boards.
Is the profession served if outside counsel are just going to be replaced
on corporate boards by inside counsel? The lawyer-director, after all, was
220. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, 1940: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. pt. 1, 27,
712 (1940) (statement of Douglas T. Johnston, Vice President of the Investment Counsel
Association of America) quoted in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 195 n.38 (1984).
221. Cf. E. SMaGEZL, supra note 2, at 255-56 (analyzing the importance of pride to the
operations of the large law firm).
222. J. GOTULDEN, THE SuPERLAwYBRs 51-52 (1971).
223. See supra note 1.
224. See, e.g., Note, supra note 31 (analyzing duties as directors of outside general counsel
in terms of the duties of "corporate counsel-directors").
225. Cary, Professional Responsibility in the Practice of Corporate Law-The Ethics of Bar
Associations, 29 Riac. Am. B. Crry N.Y. 443, 446 (1974). See generally sources cited in Riger,
The Model Rules and Corporate Practice-New Ethics for a Competitive Era, 17 Come. L.
Rnv. 729, 743 n.54 (1985).
226. See, e.g., Riger, supra note 225, at 745-46.
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to be appointed so he could combine his legal knowledge with "the knowl-
edge of the company and the insight which he gains in his position" to
advance responsible corporate action.227 Inside counsel, as we have seen,
supposedly are employed by corporations for just this reason. Won't they
claim the seat on the Board given up by outside counsel? What does the
profession gain by substituting one high-status lawyer for another whose
professional status reportedly is not qualitatively different from that of elite
firm practitioners? 2s And, if the argument is accepted that lawyer-directors
need independence, doesn't the profession decrease its capacities for ethical
action by supporting the substitution of organizationally dependent for
organizationally independent lawyers? Outside counsel who refuse to serve
on corporate boards may relieve themselves from facing difficult choices.
But for the profession, isn't this just a Pontius Pilate solution?
Instead of arguing that outside counsel ought not serve on corporate
boards because their independence might be compromised, it might be
argued that lawyers ought not so serve because it involves them in making
decisions that extend beyond the profession's jurisdiction. Regardless of
whether or not economic temptations make conscientious law firm practi-
tioners reluctant to serve on corporate boards, perhaps the profession ought
not to esteem such service because lawyers ought not be important political
actors within corporations.229 Because directors are required to make mixed
legal/business judgments and decide corporate policies, it might be argued,
it is inappropriate for lawyers to serve as directors, and only appropriate
for them to be called on as consultants to offer that which is within the
profession's jurisdiction, legal advice.? 0
On the other hand, the Inside Counsel Movement claims that lawyers can
gain the corporate power necessary so that their professional judgment is
not compromised and influences the corporation toward legal ends. And,
whatever outside counsel do, corporations will hire lawyers to serve on their
boards because they recognize the need for lawyerly judgment. The Inside
227. Note, supra note 31, at 792.
228. I know of no discussion of the lawyer-director issue that recognizes that, at best, the
efforts to suggest that it is ethically improper for outside counsel to serve on boards might
result merely in their substitution by inside counsel. Other discussions do not appear to
recognize that the profession successfully has made a jurisdictional claim for the work lawyer.
directors perform. Corporations appear to feelPthey need lawyers, employing inside counsel
when it is more efficient, to be institutional personnel.
229. A comparison with the medical profession might be useful to support this argument.
Certainly, a doctor serving as Surgeon General of the United States can be an esteemed
member of her profession. But, the medical profession certainly doesn't include within its
esteemed elite a Dr. Scholl or a doctor serving as an institutional actor at a health food, let
alone a tobacco, company.
230. See Mundheim, supra note 31, at 1514-15 (remarks of Sonde and Bialkin, participants
in panel discussion) (legal advice should not be influenced by business judgment); Rostow,
supra note 31, at 147-48.
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Counsel Movement challenges the profession to confront the inconsistency
between the increased status it accords inside counsel and its claims that
outside counsel ought to withdraw from corporate boards. It also challenges
the profession to decide whether it will override client demands for lawyers
to be influential and independent counselors.
Whether the profession can maintain a jurisdictional claim for lawyers
being influential corporate actors is a question of fact.23' Whether it ought
to impose restrictions on its jurisdictional claims is a normative question.
Ought the ideal and practice of the independent and influential counselor
be supported by the profession? 23 2
A pragmatic answer might address whether it would be better for inside
counsel to see themselves as law managers, rather than corporate counsel
with high professional status. It also might address whether inside counsel's
influential advice ought to be relinquished to others, as the profession has
relinquished investment advice to others. If so, the argument has not been
made. The Inside Counsel Movement has been welcomed within the pro-
fession and inside counsel's capabilities for meeting professional standards
has been acclaimed.23
Assuming that independent and influential counselors do more good than
harm, 2 4 the rejection of this role is best supported by appeals to client
231. But see Larson, On the Nostalgic View of Lawyers' Role: Comment on Kagan and
Rosen's 'On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice,' 37 STAN. L. REv. 445 (1985)
(arguing that it is inevitable given corporate needs that lawyers will not be called upon to play
an influential role).
232. For a different answer to this question, see Kagan & Rosen, supra note 49.
233. Inside counsel's recognition is consistent with professional history: The jurisdictions
inside counsel now claim, the profession once claimed for outside counsel, who were praised
for influencing corporate choices by their professional judgments. See supra notes 86, 148 &
217 and accompanying text. Unless inside counsel stand where giants once trod or inside
counsel's lack of organizational independence results in their co-optation, rejecting. inside
counsel's claims would sever the profession from its historic claim of moral and social
significance for its members who challenged the boundaries of professional jurisdiction in
becoming trusted advisors of management.
234. I cannot prove this assumption. I only have three indicators that it might be true.
First, there are examples of positive benefit flowing from lawyer influence and the low reported
incidence of the manipulator role. See Kagan & Rosen, supra note 49. Second, there is the
use of in terrorum decrees, rather than closely defined regulations, by courts seeking to
stimulate lawyers to be influential corporate actors. See, e.g., In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb.
28, 1981). The third evidence I have is that inside counsel, by playing the influential and
independent counselor role, have gained professional status. As this paper is written to hold
the profession to its ideals, I take this to indicate that inside counsel are realizing professional
values.
Nevertheless, it may be that overall lawyer influence has a negative effect. This may
result from inadequacies in the law or the spread of overcompliance. Cf. R. KAGAN & E.
BARDACH, supra note 163 (regulators demanding strict legal compliance may do more harm
than good). It also may result because businessmen or safety engineers are more committed
to legal and moral norms than are their lawyers, bearers of an amoral morality. Cf. Pepper,
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autonomy: Clients ought to have the autonomy to use lawyers for the
special purposes (within the law) they choose. Whatever validity this argu-
ment generally has, it is at its weakest when applied to large corporate
organizations.235 And, this argument is not empirically supported by current
corporate demands. Large corporate clients have not rejected lawyers being
influential corporate actors. In an era in which clients employ inside counsel
to be institutional personnel, it is not lawyer's exercising influence over
their clients that is paternalistic. It is the profession's rejection of the
independent and influential counselor role that bespeaks paternalism.
It might be argued that corporate demand for inside counsel is not a
valid indicator of autonomous choice because corporate decisions have been
distorted by lawyers' claims of broad jurisdiction. But even if we were to
assume that large corporations' consumer power is constrained by the
profession, the premise that they would not hire lawyers but for the
profession's claims is not well supported by the reports of the Inside Counsel
Movement. Rather than resisting broad claims by the legal profession,
clients are giving new tasks and responsibilities to inside counsel.
While the tradition of the professions has been that "the client, unlike
the customer, is not always right,"' ' 6 there has been a movement in recent
years toward a consumer model of professionalism.2 7 The appeal to con-
sumer power, as the Rules of Professional Conduct demonstrates,23 how-
ever, must be balanced against proper professional interests. Control over
the services supplied is a basic and justifiable part of the professionalization
The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM.
B. FouND. REs. J. 613 (arguing that lawyers ought to adopt an amoral morality). Furthermore,
more harm than good may result because lawyers actually have little influence so that the
dominating result of lawyers claiming influence is the mystification of predatory capitalism.
Cf. Gordon, supra note 63.
But even if, in the past, lawyers have not merited moral praise, the influential and
independent counselor role creates possibilities for the profession to realize value, and this
essay is directed toward that realization. Cf. Lorne, supra note 83, at 429 ("While there are
no reliable data, it is clear that most corporate lawyers try to persuade their clients to operate
in a socially desirable manner . . ").
235. M. DAN-CoHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR Bu-
REAucRATIc SocrTY (1986) (corporation's autonomy rights are only derivative from the
autonomy rights of their constituents); Rhode, Ethical Perspective on Legal Practice, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 589, 595-605 (1985) (criminal defense paradigm for legal ethics inappropriate as applied
to large corporations).
236. Marshall, The Recent History of Professionalism in Relation to Social Structure and
Social Policy, in CLASS, CmI1ZENSmP, AND SocIAL DEVELOPMENT 164 (1965).
237. See Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CoRNLL L. REv. 1021, 1023,
1026-35 (1982); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 702 (1977). For the professions generally, see Illich, Disabling Professions, in DIsABuNG
PROFESSIONS (1977); Barber, Control and Responsibility in the Powerful Professions, 93 PoL.
Sci. Q. 599 (1978).
238. See, e.g., RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.7(a) (client consent does not cure all conflicts).
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project.239 How far this project constrains "the scope and nature of the
lawyer's representation" and expands matters that are "related to the
representation" is defined both by individual professionals and by profes-
sional processes. 4
In the current situation, if the profession were to limit its jurisdictional
claims and lawyers striving to elite status were not willing to be influential
actors, clients' first response would be to hire less professionally directed
lawyers. The Inside Counsel Movement claims that when high-status lawyers
refuse to assume influential corporate roles, clients receive lesser quality
service. The rejection of its claims in the name of consumer power insures
that clients, until lawyers are replaced by other specialists, will receive less
professional service. Again, the Inside Counsel Movement challenges the
profession to articulate why lawyers ought not play a political role in client
decisionmaking. It challenges the profession either to affirm the burden of
the profession's past claims or to articulate why resistance to the Inside
Counsel Movement does not deny past claims to the moral and social
significance of the practice of the influential and independent counselor
role.
It perhaps is not inappropriate to personalize the challenge of the Inside
Counsel Movement. The analysis here suggests the following: Any member
of the legal profession who accords increased respect to lawyers working in
corporate legal departments, perhaps someone like yourself, is recognizing
the political nature of professional judgment; lawyers influence not only
corporate actions to comply with the law, but also corporate goals and
commitments beyond the law's dictates. This recognition, I hope, includes
demanding ethical responsibilities in the exercise of this influence. The
Inside Counsel Movement thus has led the most surprising group of people
to recognize that corporate lawyers function as responsible politicians.
Beyond the ideology of procedural justice, discussion is required by the
Inside Counsel Movement of what are the demands of the political respon-
sibility which the profession exercises and praises.
B. Rule 1.13: Organizational Representation and Corporate Power
"Who is the Client?" is a question that arises whenever professional
judgment is pitted against client directives. It does not arise, at least with
any compelling difficulty, when the lawyer and client are agreed on what
239. See M. LARSON, supra note 107, at ch. 4 (basis of professionalization project is to
define supply); Garth, Independent Professional Power and the Search for a Legal Ideology
with a Progressive Bite, 62 IND. L.J. 183 (1987) (legal profession justifiably has power to limit
what is supplied).




the lawyer ought to do. It arises when the client questions the lawyer's
diagnoses of the client's problem, her inferences about what needs to be
known about or is relevant to the problem, or her recommendations as to
how to treat the problem?21 Then the lawyer and client both claim juris-
diction to determine how the lawyer's work should proceed. The question
"Who is the client?" arises because law is a client-serving profession, so
that professional work is not determined only by the professional's judg-
ment, but also by exercises of the client's autonomy rights to control the
lawyer's service . 2
The shared jurisdiction of lawyers and clients over lawyers' actions has
two basic constraints. First, regardless of who is the client, the client's
power is restricted by the profession's exclusive control over certain juris-
dictional areas: The lawyer may not engage in certain work regardless of
client directions.23 Second, compliance with client directives requires the
lawyer to ascertain that client decisions are made autonomously, as for
example, by being informed choices. 24
Like a lawyer serving individuals, a lawyer serving organizations is bound
by the profession's claim to exclusive jurisdictional control: Organizational
representation, according to the Rules of Professional Conduct, "does not
limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility" to not engage in prohibited
actions?5s But, unlike a lawyer serving individuals, a lawyer serving an
organization cannot readily ascertain the client's decision. In all represen-
tation, ascertaining client decisions is difficult because the client is not only
autonomous from the lawyer but also dependent on her. Lawyers can
influence clients. But, the test of improper influence-whether the client is
deprived of the right to make an autonomous decision-normally is un-
problematically defined for individual legal service by legal and cultural
norms for the "comprehending and responsible adult."'2 6 When organiza-
tional lawyers' professional judgments are pitted against the directives of
corporate actors, however, the test is more difficult, because it is not an
autonomous actor which is being served, but a corporation. 247
241. Cf. supra text accompanying note 210.
242. See supra note 27 (discussing client's rights over lawyer actions).
243. See, e.g., RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.2(e).
244. See id. at Rule 1.4, 1.14 (on determining the client's decisions). In determining what
are client decisions, the lawyer needs to ascertain that the client's reasoning processes meet
minimal standards. Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. R . 454.
245. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13 comment 6.
246. Id. at Rule 1.4 comment 3.
247. Id. at Rule 1.13(a). The problem for the lawyer might be described as one of how to
"resolve the conflict between the dictates of loyalty to a professional ideal, to a transcendent
and nebulous client, and to immediate colleagues and possibly close personal friends." Slovak,
supra note 60, at 757. Assuming professional loyalty, the question boils down to how the
claims of a lawyer's judgment are put into effect when the lawyer and corporate agent both
have claims to ascertain and influence what are the corporate interests.
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In addressing the problem of organizational representation, Rule 1.13 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 2 addresses both the scope of the
profession's jurisdictional claims and the manner in which the lawyer
ascertains the organization's decisions. The following analysis of the Rule
begins with a brief discussion of the profession's exclusive jurisdictional
claims. This analysis draws on the facts about corporate legal service
developed in the previous sections. Thereafter, it addresses two major
problems with interpretations of Rule 1.13. The Rule sets forth a minimal
claim to exclusive jurisdiction that the Comment inexplicably interprets as
defining the maximal extent of a lawyer's jurisdictional claims. The scope
thereby set out does not accord with the jurisdictional claims made by inside
counsel and that apparently are accepted by their corporate employers.
Furthermore, in defining how client decisions are ascertained, the Rule relies
on a hierarchical chain-of-command that bears little relation to the dynamics
of large organizations. To make these points, the discussion returns to client
demands for the new breed of inside counsel. To that extent, this argument
only addresses organizational representation of large corporate clients. Con-
sequently, this argument may be limited to indicating that although Rule
1.13 has been praised for affirming inside counsel's "professional status
and stature," 249 it neither supports the Inside Counsel Movement's jurisdic-
tional claims nor their actions to maintain and gain corporate power. But,
to the extent the Movement's claims are supported by our general knowledge
of organizations, 250 this argument has a further reach.
The problem is that Rule 1.13 can be interpreted as offering a metaphysics
that is inappropriate to organizational life. To hold, for example, that the
client is "a distinct entity, clearly definable and the source of identifiable
lines of authority' 25' is both descriptively false and normatively ignorant.
It assumes that goals come first and action comes later. 2 2 Most important,
it assumes that organizational goals are decided independently both of how
its legal services are organized and what lawyers actually do. The Rule asks
"Do organizations have goals?" The Rule appears to answer that goals
emerge from and are ascertained by the client's formal organizational chart.
248. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13.
249. Pirsig, Book Review, 1986 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 133, 139 (reviewing G. HAZARD & W.
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (1985)).
250. See supra notes 145, 149, 150-52, 162-63, 167 & 177-79 and accompanying text.
251. ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT 350 (1988) (D.C. Bar
Association Opinion identifying agency not "public interest" or "entire government" as
government lawyer's client).
252. See March, supra note 126. Rule 1.13 appears to present a hierarchial command
structure as embodying the norms of a "comprehending and responsible" organization. Cf.
supra text accompanying note 246. For organizational comprehension or response to their
environments, including the legal one, such norms are neither descriptive of our major corporate
organizations nor deemed desirable by current organizational theory. See, e.g., sources cited
supra at notes 145, 150, 152, 163 & 179 and infra at notes 273 & 276.
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Organizational analysts know this is descriptively false. They suggest that
the proper questions for determining "Who is the client?" are: "Who sets
organizational goals, and How are organizational goals set?" 3 These ques-
tions place ethical responsibilities on those involved in the goal-setting
processes, not on an abstracted agency that limits responsibility by "iden-
tifiable lines of authority."
With respect to the profession's claims to exclusive jurisdiction, Rule 1.13
grants to lawyers professionally backed power to require the corporate
hierarchy to ratify agent decisions: For a limited class of actions2 4 the
lawyer has the professional obligation to force "reconsideration ' 25 all the
way up to "the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organiza-
tion."26
As such, the Rule does not so much guide organizational representation
as indicate the procedure to be followed in withdrawing from representation.
The Rule is a sensible solution for the case on which much professional
attention has been focussed: when the corporate board rejects the lawyer's
recommendations.2 7 In other cases, as noted in the discussion of preventive
law, seeking a veto by formal review threatens to breach the trust necessary
for continuing lawyer-client relationsY58 As Professor Gillers puts it, the
Rule tells the lawyer that "[y]our responsibility to a corporate client who
is gravely wronged is to be silent and walk away."' ' 9
In most cases, the Rule is, at best, irrelevant or, at worse, counterpro-
ductive. As staff or consultants, lawyers often are called upon to contest
managerial decisions. They need more effective power than demanding
hierarchical review.3 ° To the extent then that the lawyer is directed to seek
253. W. Scowr, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL AND OPEN SYsrEm 264 (1981).
254. The Rule defines the exclusive jurisdictional claims to which the Rule applies as those
matters that are "related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of the law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization,
and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization." RPC, supra note 21, at Rule
1.13(b). The scope of the profession's exclusive jurisdiction may be drawn too narrowly. See,
e.g., Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate
Counsel Disclosure, I GEo. J. LEGAL ETrics 289 (1987).
255. When a corporate actor is "engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter." RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13(b).
256. Id. at Rule 1.13(b)(1), (3). This process may involve bringing in support from "a
separate legal opinion." Id. at Rule 1.13(b)(2).
257. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, ETmcs IN Tm PRAcTIcE OF LAW 43-68 (1978).
258. See supra notes 162-63 & 177-79 and accompanying text; see also Kaplan, Some
Ruminations on the Role of Counsel for a Corporation, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 873 (1980).
To be influential with clients, a lawyer "must avoid being perceived within the corporate
hierarchy as an officious tale-telling intermeddler." Id. at 878.
259. Gillers, supra note 254, at 304.
260. See supra Section II(b), (c); see also Gillers, supra note 254, at 299 n.47 ("The
corporate lawyer, like any supervisor, who comes across pilferage or minor expense account
padding would, absent explicit contrary instruction, enjoy implied authority to caution the
actor without having to report him.").
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review of subordinate decisions through hierarchical channels, the Rule will
deprive many lawyers of the corporate power reposed in them to operate
outside hierarchical channels. It will stifle their abilities to influence cor-
porate actors. Better, then, that the Rule's emphasis on corporate hierarchy
be taken as largely irrelevant, and that the use of hierarchical channels is
only suggested as one way to pursue corporate compliance for those excep-
tional cases where formal review better complies with the Rule's directive
to "minimize disruption of the organization. ' 261
Rather than interpreting the Rule as only setting forth directives when
the corporate board approves illegalities, the Rules' comments and the notes
that accompanied its 1981 Draft suggest that the Rule also defines the
maximal limits of corporate lawyers' jurisdiction. The 1981 Draft Legal
Background Notes state: "The boundaries of the lawyer's proper concern,
and thus the scope of his professional obligation, are marked by the law
defining the authority . . . vested in the . :. agents of the organization. '262
This restriction of a lawyer's proper jurisdictional claims is supported by
the Comment to the Rule:
When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions
ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence
is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones
entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province ...
Clear justification should exist for seeking review over the head of the
constituent normally responsible for it.2-
In other words, lawyers are only to challenge agents who have "no
authority.' '264 Organizational representation "does not require challeng-
ing ... decisions [that] are properly within the scope of the other agent's
authority.' '265 It certainly is the case that where an agent has no authority
to take the contemplated action for the corporation that the lawyer, within
"the scope of his professional obligation," may require that the act be
ratified. But why ought "[tihe boundaries of the lawyer's proper concern
[be] marked by the law defining the authority of [other] agents?"
The justification is that corporate agents have a right to act without
lawyer second-guessing, fenced by what constitutes breaches of the law266
261. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13(b). Rule 1.13(b)(1) to (3) are offered as "measures
among others." Id.
262. ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Notes on Rule 1.13 (Proposed Final Draft 1981), reprinted in Slovak, supra
note 60, at 781-94 [hereinafter 1981 RPC Draft]. The Notes criticize the Code of Professional
Responsibility because its "provisions do not define the areas of decisionmaking with which
the lawyer should be professionally concerned ... ." Id. at 790.
263. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13 comment 4.
264. 1981 RPC Draft, supra note 262, at 790 ("[A]gents have no authority to seek illegal
ends or employ unlawful means.").
265. Id. at 791.
266. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13 comment 4 ("[D]ifferent considerations arise when
the lawyer knows that the organization may be substantially injured by action of constituent
that is in violation of law.").
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or of their fiduciary duties.267 In this argument, the language of the Rule
that an organizational actor is not just a "person connected with the
entity," 268 but is a "constituent ' 269 of the corporate body takes on an
implication it cannot hold. Corporate agents are taken to be constituents
possessing rights bestowed by the corporation by whatever is its current
allocation of responsibility and channels for review. According to the
Comment, the organization has a clearly defined hierarchy that must be
respected by the lawyer it employs.270
The problem with this understanding is that it gives too much rigidity to
dynamic corporate bodies. Corporate actors certainly are bearers of their
own rights; they are people. Consequently, serving organizational clients
generates conflict of interest problems.271 But, corporations do not bestow
rights on their agents. 272 To its actors, the corporation allocates power,
which for them is a dynamic, shifting resource. 273 The jurisdictional limits
established in the Comment transforms the powers corporations give their
agents into rights as against lawyers.
It may be true that exercises of state power to resolve disputes ought to
take place by testing rights in prescribed channels. It is not at all clear
however that organizational clients are best served by adopting a comparable
system for dispute resolution. Consider, for example, what jurisdictional
claims and responsibilities for raising disputes corporations place on their
managers. How would a corporation treat a manager who saw a serious
problem and decided not to do anything about it because it was outside his
job definition?274 How should a corporation treat a manager who failed to
267. Id. ("Even in the absence of organization policy, however, the lawyer may have an
obligation to refer a matter to higher authority, depending on the seriousness of the matter
and whether the constituent in question has apparent motives to act at variance with the
organization's interest.").
268. MODEL CODE OF PRorEssIoNAL RESPON sImIITY EC 5-18 (1981) [hereinafter CPR].
269. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13(a).
270. Lawyers should act through "prescribe[d] channels for such review." Id. at Rule 1.13
comment 4.
271. Id. at Rule 1.13(d), (e).
272. This does not deny that the law may impose duties, and correlative rights, on particular
members of the corporate governance structure. See, e.g., REMSED MODEL BusN-ESS CORP.
AcT § 8.30 (1984) (duties of directors).
273. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text; see also M. CROZIER, THE BUR AucRAxrc
PHENoMENoN (1964); H. SIMON, ADnmIsmTRAI BEHAVIOR 220-22 (1947); 0. WrLALesoN,
CoRPORATE CONTROL AND Busnmss BEHAvioR 41-53 (1970); Lazarsfeld & Menzel, On the
Relationship between Individual and Collective Properties, in A SocloLooixCA READER ON
Com, L'Ex ORoAmnzoNS 499 (A. Etzioni ed. 1969) (corporate power operates not through
individual choice but through complex decision processes).
274. Compare RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13(b) (limiting duties to matters "related to
the representation") with Corporate Attorneys Going to Preventive Law, supra note 6 (in a
survey of Fortune 500 top executives, 74% responded that "the legal staff should initiate
involvement in corporate activities").
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warn the corporation because he was not certain that it would be substan-
tially injured? 27
Managers and inside counsel have more responsibility and discretion to
define their jurisdiction than the Rule gives lawyers. Managers understand
the presence of conflict is endemic in business and that, although hierarchical
review threatens disruption, to get along, you don't have to go along. 276
The problem in solving conflict by using hierarchical channels is that conflict
"is a function of disagreement over the reality of interdependence. ' 277 When
"the lawyer validly assumes that his client has directed him to defer to the
decisions of his co-agents," 27s she denies the interdependence that the
corporation has sought to establish by hiring lawyers.
The "areas of decision-making with which the lawyer should be profes-
sionally concerned ' 279 set forth by the 1981 Notes and Comment to the
Rule do not comport with those claimed by the Inside Counsel Movement.
The Movement's justification originates in clients who hire lawyers to make
"[d]ecisions concerning policy and operations." Restricting lawyers' juris-
diction by other agents' authority both fails to recognize inside counsel's
practice, which involves them within the jurisdiction of other agents in
mixed law/business questions, and undermines their claims to be recognized
as high status lawyers. If professional jurisdiction is so limited, inside
counsel, like lawyers who have left the profession to become business
managers, practice outside of the profession's concerns.
Rule 1.13 speaks as if lawyers had no corporate power. The profession
cannot cede to its lawyers corporate power, but it can attempt to take away
power and responsibilities imposed on its members by clients. May a lawyer
challenge a corporate decision within another agent's authority? If the
lawyer has not won the power to determine the decision, must the lawyer
withdraw her jurisdictional claim? When a lawyer possesses requisite cor-
porate power, there is no "problem of conflict between a lawyer's profes-
sional judgment and that of an organization officer or employee. ' 280 Except
to the extent she unethically wields her power, 21' ought not, as inside counsel
claim, the lawyers' "allegiance to the entity' 28 2 include using whatever
corporate power they possess?
275. Compare RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13(b) (requiring that the lawyer "know" and
using "substantial injury" as one test for initiating action) with J. DONNELL, supra note 169,
at 83 (executives want inside counsel advice on corporate social responsibility) and Stichnoth
& Dolan, supra note 157 (managers criticize lawyers who do not anticipate problems).
276. P. LAWRENCE & J. LORSCH, ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT 222 (1967); Thomas &
Schmidt, A Survey of Managerial Interest with Respect to Conflict, 1976 AcAD. MoanT. J.
315. For a discussion of the general functionality of conflict, see L. CosER, THE FUNcTIONS
OF SociAl COuFLICT (1956); G. SiMEL, CONFUCT AN TBE WEB OF GRoup-AFFILlATiONS (1955).
277. V. THoMsSON, MODERN ORGANIZATION 108 (1977).
278. G. HAZARD & W. HoDEs, supra note 249, at 234.
279. 1981 RPC Draft, supra note 262, at 790.
280. Id.
281. For example, if the corporate actors with whom the lawyer deals are not personally
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The language of the Rule might be interpreted to support such a reading.
Rule 1.13(b) instructs the lawyer to proceed by balancing against each other
the need for action,213 the lawyer's responsibilities24 and the various re-
sponsibilities weighing on the corporate agent.2 5 From this, it might be
inferred, as the Inside Counsel Movement claims, that "the lawyer and
other agents of the entity are on the same legal footing [and may proceed
by] overruling, if need be, the views of other highly placed agents. ' ' 26
Although this formulation attempts to give lawyers more power than they
might be able to win,287 it recognizes that lawyers' jurisdiction with respect
to their corporate clients is won in struggles over the scope of a lawyers'
responsibilities.
The balancing suggested by the language of the Rules leaves lawyers and
clients to negotiate about jurisdiction and power. This recognizes that the
profession can avoid transforming agent power into rights against lawyers,
but the profession has only a limited role to play in giving lawyers corporate
power. However, this balancing provides no guidance as to what ought to
be "the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation" or how to "proceed
as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. '"' 8
Rather than defining maximal jurisdictional claims, Rule 1.13 should
permit lawyers to negotiate with corporate actors about the extent of their
jurisdictional claims to influence the client organization so long as corporate
accountability is not thereby compromised. Lawyers ought to serve organ-
izations as they and their clients agree, not only as enforcers of the corporate
hierarchy when agents exceed their authority. To meet this end, the language
setting forth maximal jurisdictional claims ought to be dropped. In its stead,
language such as the following should be inserted:
An attorney serving an organization should develop a strategy for legal
problem solving in collaboration with the constituents of the organiza-
represented, the lawyer must satisfy the requirements of Rule 4.3. RPC, supra note 21, at
Rule 4.3 (dealing with unrepresented persons).
282. CPR, supra note 268, at EC 5-18.
283. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13(b) ("In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall
give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences ... the apparent
motivation of the person involved . .. and any other relevant considerations.").
284. Id. ("the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation").
285. The lawyer is to consider the responsibilities imposed on the manager by the client's
hierarchical organization ("the responsibility in the organization ... of the person involved")
and by the client's political organization ("the policies of the organization concerning such
matters"). Id.
286. G. HAZARD & W. HODEs, supra note 248, at 241, quoted in Pirsig, supra note 249, at
137-38; cf. 1981 RPC Draft, supra note 262, at 787 ("[a] lawyer, like other employees or
agents of an organization, is a co-agent").
287. "It places organization counsel in a powerful and controlling position which neither
an organization nor its counsel is likely to contemplate or accept." Pirsig, supra note 249, at
138.
288. RPC, supra note 21, at Rule 1.13(b).
19891
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tion. This strategy should be reasonably related to the goals and resources
of the organization. In obtaining consent from corporate constituents
to pursue this strategy, lawyers should strive to minimize disruptions to
the organization caused by their responsibilities weakening the corporate
structures needed for effective decision-making. 2 9
This provision would base lawyer assumptions of corporate power on
consent. It would guide their work by service to the entity. Perhaps most
significantly, it would emphasize that the duty to "minimize disruptions"
imposed by Rule 1.13(b) relates not to the need to maintain the corporate




This addition to the Rule is compatible with the growth of inside counsel.
It affirms professional standards of client service in whatever work lawyers
undertake for their organizational clients. But it does not define the scope
of proper jurisdictional claims. In part this lack of specificity is required
because, as institutional personnel, lawyers cannot negotiate the scope of
their representation except by abstractions about their functions. 291 Formally,
corporations may make staff-line distinctions. Staff may forswear their
allegiance to a hierarchical order, pledging to be carriers of only neutral
information. 292 But managers and their corporations know that valuable
staff members negotiate their own jurisdiction. 293 To gain the advantages
of informal auditing, if not the benefits of collaboration, corporations give
staffs functional job descriptions and a manipulable hierarchical position
within the corporation. Similarly, the scope of lawyers' jurisdictional claims
cannot be precisely defined. But, the profession needs to legitimate sufficient
jurisdiction so that lawyers can determine what best comports with their
professional requirements:
The lawyer is in the best position to choose his next step .... What is
required, in short, is some prompt action that leads to the conclusion
that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem,
rather than having capitulated to the . . . client. . . . The lawyer's
continued interaction with his client will ordinarily hold the greatest
promise of corrective action. So long as a lawyer is acting in good faith
289. This paragraph is modelled on A MODEL PEER REVIEW SYSTEM 17 (Discussion Draft
1980) ("Section 4: Strategy Formation"), quoted in Garth, supra note 104, at 646 n.39.
290. Cf. Gillers, supra note 254, at 299-309 (Rule 1.13 ought to protect corporate decision-
making).
291. Lawyers, both inside and outside, are part of a corporation's "shadow-staff" who
utilize overlapping lines of authority to second-guess actions that cannot be rigorously delimited.
Cf. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct
and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1153-54 (1977) (discussing mini-
boards).
292. Allen, The Line-Staff Relationship, 17 MOMT. REc. 346 (1955).
293. Goldner, The Division of Labor: Process and Power, in POwER IN ORGANIZATIONS 97
(M. Zald ed. 1970).
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and exerting reasonable efforts to prevent violations.., his professional
obligations have been met.-
By adopting language which constrains the expansion of lawyers' juris-
dictional claims by the maintenance of corporate accountability processes,
the Rule can recognize that lawyers are not just servants to the organizational
hierarchy, but may be included as political actors therein. It leaves open
the question of whether the profession ought to restrict or develop how its
practitioners' professional judgments exercise political power within an
organization. To prevent unprofessional exercises of power, the profession
ought to detail not only how lawyers need to. proceed within its exclusive
jurisdiction, but also when and how clients and lawyers may share jurisdic-
tion, as in mixed law/business decisions. 29
The second issue of organizational representation is ascertaining what
constitutes corporate decisions. Rule 1.13 appears to define organizational
decisions by imposing a hierarchical decisionmaking structure. As the dis-
cussion of preventive law practice emphasized, this often is not appropriate
to guide lawyer action. Instead, the Rule ought to incorporate provisions
that prevent lawyers from unethically utilizing their position in the process
by which organizations reach decisions.296
One provision that needs to be incorporated in the Rule would address
outside counsel's duties in regard to the powerful corporate legal depart-
ments, who have become their "clients" in fact. Certainly, outside counsel's
work can be improved when it is managed by a knowledgeable inside
counsel. But outside counsel's duties are to serve the organization, not
inside counsel. And the emergence of corporate legal departments as pow-
erful corporate actors may frustrate outside counsel serving the corporation.
Both inside and outside counsel appear to accept that inside counsel have
become the "client." As a general counsel said: "I don't purchase outside
counsel for the company. I purchase outside counsel for me." As an outside
counsel put it: "For all practical purposes, the General Counsel is the client.
He tells you what he wants done. He is the conduit to the executives . . .
. He initials your bills for payment. You basically have to make him
happy." Outside counsel may recognize that this situation serves to increase
the corporate power of corporate legal departments, 29 but generally don't
294. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 at
84,172, quoted in Kaplan, supra note 258, at 881-82.
295. Cf. Simon, supra note 240.
296. For example, lawyers should not engage in negotiations that do not respect the autonomy
rights of the individual organizational actors with whom they deal. See supra notes 244 & 281.
297. As an outside counsel complained,
I would prefer having close business relationships with executives. With many
clients, they buy legal services just like they buy cardboard boxes. You can't buy
relationships. They are valuable and important in legal work. But the General
Counsel has an interest in stopping these relationships to increase his own power.
As an inside counsel put it, "By spreading the apples around, outside counsel don't stick their
noses in management policies and try to call the shots."
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accept that this poses ethical difficulties for them: "We don't negotiate with
clients about structuring their relation with us," one outside counsel said.
Another recognized the potential problem, but denied responsibility: "Many
general counsel give outside counsel too narrow a charge. That's a problem
for the corporate legal department and the corporation, not for the outside
law firm." Yet, the ethical responsibilities continue, as one outside counsel
voiced:
If outside counsel are bridled, will we stand up? The tradition of outside
counsel independence was associated with spending the client's money
freely. Now, we have to work out a responsible partnership. Outside
counsel can't simply say, "I work for the inside lawyer. I don't work
for the company." We must create a strong professional relationship
with inside counsel giving us greater opportunities for independence.
Outside counsel's creation of a proper relationship with inside counsel
needs support from the ethics rules. In the current situation, creating such
a relationship means biting the hand that feeds outside counsel. It requires
overcoming the natural inclination to buck responsibility and not criticize
fellow members of the bar. 28 And, it would require outside counsel to
focus on the costs that inhere in the benefits of being able to deal only
with the corporate legal department and thus avoid negotiating with man-
agers, and "yield[ing] judgment of what is wanted to those amateurs who
receive the services." 299 Norms need to emerge to prevent, in inside counsel's
age of enlightenment, power becoming the determiner of relations between
outside lawyers and inside counsel.30
Outside counsel's capacity to perform ethically is enhanced when inside
counsel allow that "a lawyer who is asked to give an opinion in respect to
one aspect of a transaction is entitled to look at anything and everything
he wants to that might possibly bear on that transaction."'0 But outside
counsel tend to respond to the structure of their engagement, and complain:
"The system is set up to keep really knowledgeable people from getting
together." Consider the case of settlement. Corporations rely on their
corporate legal departments to decide when to settle a case because the
appropriateness of a settlement is hard to evaluate. But the legal depart-
298. Cf. Pierce, The Code of Professional Responsibility in the Corporate World: An
Abdication of Professional Self-Regulation, 6 U. MIcH. J. L. REF. 350, 352-53 (1973).
299. E. Huosms, MEN AND TrEI WORK 54 (1958):
It is characteristic of many occupations that the people in them, although
convinced that they themselves are the best judges, not merely of their own
competence but also of what is best for the people for whom they perform
services, are required in some measure to yield judgment of what is wanted to
those amateurs who receive the services.
Id.
300. See supra note 95.




ment's mission is to keep down legal costs. This creates an incentive to
settle, especially when the legal department is charged back for litigation
costs, but not settlement costs. Inappropriate settlements also may result
because many corporations view litigation as a legal department failure,
especially when it involves management having to sit for depositions. Will
outside counsel be concerned about the self-interest of the legal department
and insure that settlements serve the corporate client? Norms must emerge
to coordinate the work of inside and outside counsel so that outside counsel
continue to serve the corporation as an entity, not the legal department.
The art of management includes legitimizing one's goals, securing allies,
and deflecting criticism. Increasingly, inside counsel are allocating work to
outside counsel to increase the legal department's managerial authority.
Outside counsel are used not for their expertise or innovative potential, but
"to play the heavy with management," "to be a policeman," and "to take
some of the heat." Outside counsel also are used to protect inside counsel
from their own mistakes3°2 and to distance the inside lawyer and legal
department from representations in which their conflicting roles as lawyer
and employee become apparent. 303
Through these uses of outside counsel, the corporate legal department
solidifies its power within the corporation. The power of corporate legal
departments, like that of other departments, is a shifting resource. With
shifts in management philosophy or particularly bad experiences, managers
may lose the confidence of other corporate actors which is necessary to
retain their power. Many corporations, for example, rely on very expensive
independent business consultants for significant decisions. The increasingly
sophisticated use of outside counsel as backstops to inside counsel's man-
agerial power, however, suggests that the success of the inside counsel
movement will be difficult to derail. Outside counsel services can be used
by a corporate legal department to maintain its power even when corporate
accountability processes are being undermined. Norms need to emerge to
prevent outside counsel from thus providing work that does not serve the
interests of their corporate clients.
A provision might be added to Rule 1.13 to prevent outside counsel from
immunizing inside counsel's power in order to maintain organization's
302. In one case, the legal department drew up a contract with terms that placed the
corporation at a disadvantage. In contesting the contract, the legal department went outside
so that the inside counsel who negotiated the contract would not have to admit their mistake
to the other side and to the managers. Management ignorance was made possible by the
centralization of control over the legal function in the legal department. Management ignorance
also was maintained by outside counsel who did not request their involvement.
303. In one case, outside counsel was retained to argue for a zoning variance in the face
of community opposition. The legal department went outside, not because it lacked expertise,
but because it wanted to provide a target outside the corporation for community resentment.




accountability processes. Following the language of Rule 5.1 and 5.2, which
refer to responsibilities in and for the allocation of work within law firms,
I would suggest adding the following to Rule 1.13:
(a) A lawyer who provides services to an organization is bound by the
rules of professional conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at
the direction of another person.
(b) A lawyer who provides services to an organization shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the organization has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance that the legal work done for it conforms to
the rules of professional conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the
rules of professional conduct if:
(1) The violation reasonably should have been known and does not
result from a reasonable resolution of an arguable question of profes-
sional responsibility, and
(2) The violation occurs in a matter on which both have responsibilities
and the conduct is known at a time when its consequences can be
avoided or mitigated, but the lawyer fails to take reasonable action.
The addition of these provisions impose responsibility on outside counsel
for the work performed by the inside counsel who have become their
"clients." Today, outside counsel do not take responsibility for inside
counsel's work, while inside counsel take both business and professional
responsibility for their own conduct.3 04 Clients have shown their willingness
to incur the costs of monitoring outside counsel, why ought the profession
not require monitoring of inside counsel?
If proper professional work is being performed, requiring lawyers to be
their "brothers' keepers" on the representation likely would impose minimal
monitoring costs on clients and not produce disabling contentiousness. After
all, inside counsel's management of outside counsel while producing some
"chafing," apparently has not resulted in lasting friction.3 05 The adoption
of this rule will impose costs, but they may be appropriate to maintain
professional standards of client service.
What the adoption of these provisions does affect is the ability of lawyers
to limit their responsibilities. Today, outside counsel, without loss of pro-
fessional pride, can limit their representation and rely on inside counsel to
insert their work into the corporation's continuum of decisionmaking. As
long as inside counsel assume responsibility, outside counsel will let the
legal department organize their work, including providing service that is
based on hypothetical facts and determined by inside counsel's strategic
judgments.3°0
304. Inside counsel are subject to corporate sanctions for inadequate performance. Although
unlikely, inside counsel also are subject to malpractice liability, RPC, Supra note 21, at Rule
1.8(h), and professional sanctions for violations of professional rules.
305. Maher, supra note 5, at 44.
306. See supra notes 21-27.
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These provisions recognize that "at the heart of the matter [of lawyer
responsibility in organizational representation] is whether lawyers ethically
may accept limited engagements. ' ' 307 Despite reports of various horror
stories, one scholar has concluded that "no demonstrable need has been
shown" to incur the attendant costs. 08 Yet, the development of powerful
corporate legal departments suggests that the need does exist.3 9 Admittedly,
the adoption of these provisions would "be diametrically opposed to the
developing trend of separating advocates from advisers . . . in an era of
increasing specialization .... "310 But this trend creates possibilities for an
imbalance of professional power over client power that the profession ought
to address.
To the extent that inside counsel is now outside counsel's client, the
adoption of these provisions would require that outside counsel discuss with
inside counsel how to determine corporate goals and the ways in which
their operations promote legal compliance. These discussions would help
determine whether organizationally dependent inside counsel have been
captured. Outside counsel ought to examine how inside counsel's work has
been limited by corporate managers, just as outside counsel ought to examine
how their own work has been organized and predigested. Outside counsel
also ought to assess how much responsibility the legal department can
assume or delegate without compromising itself, just as outside counsel
ought to discuss with inside counsel how much responsibility over its own
work it can professionally cede.
Of course, during the course of their representation, elite lawyers now
may negotiate with inside counsel about the goals, the work, and the
responsibilities proffered to them by inside counsel. As a matter of fact, it
may very well be the case that even when inside counsel is accepted as "the
client," outside counsel influence how inside counsel organize the provision
307. Lome, supra note 83, at 482. In an innovative approach to the problems of rendering
opinions, this article directs inquiry toward a broad range of issues:
The specific questions that arise out of that larger inquiry range from whether
the adviser may render limited advice to whether a lawyer may be publicly
associated with an essential element of a transaction without being to some degree
responsible for the transaction as a whole. Somewhere in between those questions
lies the issue of the adviser's obligation to examine and pass on the work of
other counsel with greater responsibility for the entire transaction.
Id. at 482-83.
308. Id. at 485-86.
309. For one horror story that stemmed from failing to integrate the emerging division of
labor, see R. GArDossy, BAD Busumss: THE OPM SCANDAL AND To SEDUCTION OF nH
EsTABLisHMENT 228 (1985).
(Division of labor is a necessary part of organizational life, but all too often the
divided units do not work together. They may work on the same deals for the
same client, and they may rely on each other, but they frequently have very
different interests. They are more segmented than they are an integrated whole.).
310. Lome, supra note 83, at 485.
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of legal services. They may question inside counsel's statements about client
goals, what work ought to be performed and who ought to perform it.
It is a consequence of the position argued for in this paper that if such
negotiations now are occurring, they raise fundamental issues of professional
ethics. How client goals are determined, how the scope of representation is
limited and who should have responsibility for actions relating to the
representation are questions whose answers ought to comport with the
values of professional service, whether lawyers are negotiating with lawyers
or with non-lawyer clients. The answers to these questions are not pre-
determined by the goals organizations have. They influence what goals
emerge for the corporation. The answers require determining "Who sets
organizational goals?" and "How are organizational goals set?" 3"
I do not assume that ethical demands force negotiation about these
questions to reach only one set of outcomes. A responsible elite practitioner,
for example, might agree to work on a hypothetical set of facts when
dealing with one legal department but not another. I do assume that the
outcomes ought to depend on the capacities of the client, legal department,
and the elite firm. The outcomes ought to maximize and not weaken "the
corporate structures needed for effective decision-making. '"312 Whether inside
counsel ought to be able to bind the client, becoming outside counsel's
"client" in fact, ought to depend on the organizational capacities revealed
during such negotiations.
IV. CONCLUSION: SPECIALIZATION AND THE DISION OF LABOR
Chief Justice Rehnquist reports that an important consequence of the
growth of large firms has been "an increasing degree of specialization" and
that "[tihere seems to be little doubt on the part of those in practice that
specialization both serves the client and succeeds in maximizing the firm's
income." '313 The Chief Justice notes his concern that increasing specialization
decreases lawyer work satisfaction and calls for empirical research by law
school faculty to verify his anecdotal evidence that legal practice has become
"more like drudgery. ' 31 4
Concerns about the specialization of legal work have been voiced through-
out the history of the American legal profession. 31 5 Specialization has been
311. See supra text accompanying note 253.
312. See supra text accompanying note 289.
313. Rehnquist, supra note 55, at 153-54.
314. Id. at 152, 154.
315. Chief Justice Rehnquist supposedly is detailing changes that occurred during "the past
generation," but over 50 years ago similar concerns over similar changes were expressed by a
prior Chief Justice and a prior Indiana Law Journal author:
The changed character of the lawyer's work has made it difficult for him to
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linked to a variety of ills. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns about the
decreased satisfaction of increasingly well-paid and specialized lawyers join
the concerns voiced by others about the effects of specialization on legal
development,1 6 the professional status of lawyers,317 the public influence of
the bar," 8 and client service. 1 9
The diversity of concerns linked to specialization ought to give pause.
Can specialization be so influential? Or, might it be an "ideological devil," 32°
blocking thought? The rhetoric of anti-specialization, I suggest, reveals not
only Faustian wishes, 32 but also a less tragic resistance to those conventional,
"natural" limits that restrict our abilities to do and be more.3 22 It is a
rhetoric than has given voice to the moral motives of a variety of profes-
sional leaders. But analysis of specialization must recognize that it is a
product of social differentiation. The appropriateness of specialization de-
pends on capacities for harnessing the disintegrative forces social differen-
tiation unleashes. Analysis of specialization ought to direct attention to the
division of labor in which specialized services are but one part.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern with the specialization of elite firm
practitioners needs to be balanced by attention to the integrative capacities
of powerful corporate legal departments. Whether client needs and public
interests are advanced by client demand for and outside counsel provision
contemplate his function in its new setting, to see himself and his occupation in
proper perspective.... The demands of practice are more continuous and
exacting. He has less time for reflection upon other than immediate professional •
undertakings.
Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HAIv. L. Rav. 1, 6 (1934).
[T]hese traditional standards of the game which we have adopted are something
of very great value to civilization, and that instead of allowing them to be wasted
down in the flood of pioneer competitive business, go-getting, eager salesmanship
and advertising, we should hold fast to them as we hold fast to our homes.
Cohen, Fiduciaries-Corporate and Lawyers, 7 IND. L. J. 295, 316 (1932). For nineteenth
century criticisms, see R. FERGUSON, LAw AND LrEs nN AmmcAN CULTURE 26, 230-31,
266, 280-90 (1984). For example, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., in 1859 described himself as a
specialist by employing the image of "the master of a small coasting vessel, that hugs the
shore," unlike the republican generalist Choate who was "a great homeward bound Indiaman,
freighted with silks and precious stones, spices and costily fabrics ... with the nation's flag
at her mast-head, navigated by the mysterious science of the fixed stars." Id. at 287.
316. See, e.g., J. SToNEi, SociAL DmNsIoNs OF LAw AND JUSrICE 55-60 (1966).
317. See, e.g., J. MrHmEws, RuFrus CHOATE: THE LAW AND Civic VmTUE 44-45 (1980).
318. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 315.
319. See, e.g., Swaine, The Impact of Big Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics
of the Modern Bar, 35 A.B.A. J. 89, 168-69 (1949) (answering the "indictment").
320. G. SnD&E, On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture, in THE CONFLICT iN MODERN
CULTURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 27 (1968).
321. V. THOMI'SON, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS viii (2d ed. 1977) ("Some people approach the
problem of bringing knowledge and authority together by [urging] 'generalists' rather than
specialists. A little thought will disclose all such proposals to be essentially regressive-a search
for a hero or a magic helper.").
322. It is thus a recurring theme in critical theory. See Gordon, New Developments in Legal
Theory, in THE Poirrics OF LAw 281 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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of specialized services will depend on the manner in which inside and outside
counsel work are integrated. Analysis of the proper allocation of work and
responsibilities between inside and outside counsel needs to incorporate both
the governance problems corporations face and the jurisdictional claims the
profession supports. As this essay has argued, outside and inside counsel
need "an entire system of rights and duties which link them together in a
durable way.'321
Studies of the division of labor in the sociological tradition always have
been studies of morality. Empirical studies of work degradation and reform,
of labor discontent, or of economic stratification and power are linked to
theoretical studies which see in the division of labor not only partial
integrations, but also "the essential condition of social solidarity" and "the
foundation of the moral order. ' '3u Whether or not sociologists admit the
critical task in which they are engaged, their work, as the self-proclaimed
positivist Durkheim noted, is in "the service that thought can and must
render . . . in fixing the goal that we must attain." '32
We might assume that over time economic forces will clarify and stabilize
relations between inside and outside counsel. Norms will emerge to guide
inside and outside counsel relations and the division of labor between them.
But, as Durkheim noted, we must render service in fixing such norms. Will
economic forces guarantee proper corporate service? Will the reciprocities
developed comport with public norms? Will outside counsel's specialization
and the emergence of the General Counsel as purchasing agent decrease the
ability of lawyers to realize value by serving as influential and independent
counselors? Furthermore, will the division of labor leave room for the public
function of the bar-its ability to support and sustain proper jurisdictional
claims and the law reform activities which have engaged lawyers in the
past?
Economically generated reciprocities, may develop norms which don't
meet the high demands of professionalism. Conformity, excessive concern
with income and consumption are generally available alternatives to satis-
faction with the intrinsic rewards of professional work. Professionalism is
a challenge, not the natural result of market forces.
Nor will this challenge be met by focussing on the weakness of legal
professionalism. When legal ethics focuses on restraining temptation, as for
example by demanding organizational independence, it fails to justify the
continued autonomy of the profession. Clients will impose governance
structures to manage lawyer autonomy. We must be forthright about the
basic problem of the professions: Why should professionals have power?
323. E. DUuHmm, THE DivisioN OF LABoR IN Socmry 406 (1964).
324. Id. at 400, 401.
325. Id. at 409.
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And, as the Inside Counsel Movement challenges, lawyer power as exercised
includes corporate power. The strength of the profession, its jurisdictional
claims to transcend organizationally-defined boundaries, requires addressing
the organizational power commanded by professional judgment.
The rules of ethics, like those of etiquette, can become impoverished in
two different ways: (1) When, in the context of their application, they
impose unjustified power; and (2) When, in the context of their application,
they fail to exercise needed power. To determine whether I am being
gracious, for example, requires an analysis of the power I am wielding and
that I am failing to exercise. Similarly, defining the ethical demands on my
activities as a lawyer requires an understanding of what I do with the power
available to me.
The claim of the Inside Counsel Movement requires that we develop
conceptions of proper professional power in corporate politics. 3 26 The virtue
of lawyers subject to intra-firm processes is not based on professional
independence. If they are ethical, their virtue lies in their exercising profes-
sional judgment to direct corporate powers. Their challenge reminds us that
professionalism demands not only the study of the frailties of temptation,
but also the study of the possibilities for political power.
326. One might expect organizational power to appear in discussions of legal counseling.
But, the casebooks on counseling deal with personal psychology, not organizational power.
The counseling problem is depicted as one of dealing with psychologically weak businessmen
who are "frustrated," or have "clammy hands." H. FRE~m.x, LEGAL INTERvIEWING AND
COUNSELING: CAsEs wrrH Com3mrN 171, 186 (1964). As David Riesman notes, "It seems to
me that people can practice law in either a huge Wall Street firm or alone on State Street and
never face any of the kinds of experiences described in these reports." Id. at 70. For a criticism
of the psychological basis of this work, see Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New
Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. RV. 487 (1980).
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